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ABSTRACT 
 
Contrary to popular academic assumption, the story of US Middle East strategy may be 
summarized by two key characteristics: reaction and incoherence.  These descriptors are especially 
true of Washington’s strategic partnership with Tel Aviv – an arrangement that emerged relatively late 
in the development of US regional strategy, in response to the stagnation of primary efforts to 
establish a strategic arrangement centred on US-Arab partnerships.  The US-Israeli partnership was 
therefore not an inevitable evolution of US strategy, but rather a product of the political pragmatism of 
the Johnson and Nixon administrations (not to mention a highly spurious interpretation of the events of 
the Jordanian civil war of September 1970).  Only in 1973, following yet another round of Arab-Israeli 
hostilities, did the US begin to revise its arrangement with Israel to redress the balance between US-
Israeli and US-Arab relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
AMERICA’S SEARCH FOR STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
Since 1949, the United States has given more financial aid to Israel – a wealthy, industrialised 
country, geographically smaller than the state of New Jersey – than it has to all the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean combined.1  In fact, in the year 2003 alone, 
American aid to Israel equated to an astonishing $10,393,258 every day.2  In addition to this massive 
economic support, the US has also shown great loyalty to Israel diplomatically, most recently over the 
Israeli Defence Forces’ controversial war with Arab guerrillas in southern Lebanon and Gaza.3
 
The remarkable scale of this assistance is reflective of the strategic value that Washington 
attaches to its partnership with Tel Aviv – a value that, while of questionable merit, is repeatedly 
emphasised to Americans by the influential Israel lobby, as recently discussed by John J. 
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt.4  However, contrary to popular assumption, American Middle East 
strategy has not always centred upon close partnership with Israel.  It is the intention of this thesis to 
explore the process by which America’s Middle East strategy developed into the staunchly pro-Israeli 
approach which dominates today.   
 
Much of the literature that explores America’s activities in the Middle East has assumed that 
the development of American regional strategy – from Truman’s Northern Tier shield to the modern 
alliance with Tel Aviv – represents an inevitable and coherent evolution.  Certainly, it is fair to say that 
                                                 
1 Richard Curtiss, Centre for Arab Culture and Dialogue (1998), ‘The Cost of Israel to the American People’, Al-Hewar 
Magazine, July/August, http://www.alhewar.com/CurtissEtAl.html (accessed 13.06.06). 
2 United States Agency for International Development (n.d.), ‘Greenbook’, http:/qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/ (accessed 09.11.05). 
3 Daniel McGrory, Beirut Correspondent (2006), ‘Why do they give weapons to Israel and food to us?’, The Times, July 26. 
4 John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt (2006), ‘The Israel Lobby’, London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 6 (March). 
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America’s strategic objective remained constant.  That objective was regional stability: the 
precondition required for containment of Communist influences, suppression of ‘radical’ Arab 
nationalism, the continued security of US economic interests (interests that included, but were not 
limited to, oil), and the preservation of Israel.5  However, it is the hypothesis of this author that, aside 
from consistency of objective, the only other common theme to be found in American Middle East 
strategy is a tendency for incoherent, reactive bilateralism. 
 
Despite the obvious strategic significance of the Middle East, at the close of the Second World 
War the United States did not have a clearly defined strategy for achieving its ambition of stability in 
the region.  Indeed, as late as 1953, the US still considered the Middle East to be a primarily British 
responsibility; Truman only engaged in the Northern Tier because it was unavoidable.6  Under the 
strategic dynamism of the Eisenhower administration, the US finally took a lead in the core states, but, 
frustrated in its attempt to realise a comprehensive regional strategy, Washington’s approach swiftly 
reverted to incoherence.  Pointedly, these early efforts were not focused upon developing a 
partnership with Israel, but achieving a strategic arrangement with the Arab bloc.  In fact, it was only in 
the late 1960s, once the pro-Arab option had been comprehensively exhausted, that the concept of a 
strategic arrangement with Tel Aviv came to the fore. 
 
The emergence of the US-Israeli partnership was therefore not an inevitable development, but 
rather a pragmatic reaction to the strategic uncertainty which had plagued Washington since the 
collapse of Eisenhower’s pan-Arab efforts in the late 1950s; a ‘next best’ option, promoted by Israel’s 
remarkable victory in the Six Day War of 1967 and apparent contribution to the pacification of Jordan 
following the outbreak of civil war in September 1970.  More importantly, as a strategic solution for 
Middle East instability, the US-Israeli partnership was as incoherent (and therefore inadequate) as 
previous models had been.  The issues which plagued the Middle East were sensitive and required 
nuanced, region-wide engagement if they were to be resolved successfully.  In light of these needs, 
Washington’s controversial alliance with Tel Aviv – blunt and bilateral – was entirely ill-suited to 
advanced America’s objective of lasting stability.  In fact, it actually threatened to exacerbate existing 
problems.  Blinded by its unique interpretation of the Jordan crisis, the White House failed to identify 
this danger and therefore made no effort to amend its approach, thereby leaving the American Middle 
East system vulnerable to shock, but also laying the foundations of a strategic model that continues to 
dominate Middle East geo-politics to this day. 
                                                 
5 Avi Shlaim (1988), ‘The Impact of U.S. Policy in the Middle East’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter), 16; 
NSC (1953), ‘United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, July 14’, Declassified Documents Reference 
System, hereafter DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), Document Number: CK3100083997, 3-4.  
6 Halford L. Hoskins (1953), ‘Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East’, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 47, No. 1 (March), 189. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945-1969 
 
From the late 1940s it was increasingly clear that the United States needed to redefine its 
approach to the Middle East in order to compensate for Britain’s deteriorating position.  Six years of 
total war with Germany had severely drained Whitehall’s resources, both economically and politically, 
to the inevitable detriment of Britain’s imperial vitality.  Although America’s nascent anti-Soviet strategy 
predicated a continued British role in the Middle East, such a reality could not be guaranteed.  
Certainly, Britain enjoyed considerable influence in the region, thanks to its traditional overlordship and 
extensive military presence.  However, with the Foreign Office facing mounting pressure from 
indigenous movements to withdraw Britain’s colonial control and the Exchequer questioning its 
capacity to meet the financial burden of maintaining bases in Cyprus, Jordan, Iraq and Suez, Britain’s 
strategic primacy in the Middle East was waning.   
 
The United States did not replace Great Britain as the strategic guardian of the Middle East 
overnight however.  The strategic redefinition was a lengthy and piecemeal process, which saw the 
United States take a number of small steps towards regional primacy.  In the first instance, Britain’s 
abdication of Greece led Washington to adopt increasing responsibility for the strategically significant 
Northern Tier states.  Directly bordering the Soviet Union, Greece, Turkey and Iran formed the basis of 
an enduring American security strategy that sought to shield the Middle East from an anticipated 
Soviet expansion.  However, there was no effort to incorporate the core Middle Eastern states into an 
American system at this stage; the Northern Tier strategy simply provided a barrier between the 
Soviets and the Middle East and made no effort to usurp Britain’s primacy in the core states. 
 
In fact, Washington did not seek to expand the American system into the heart of the Middle 
East until the mid-1950s and, as before, the strategic expansion was reactive rather than proactive.  
Despite Truman’s hopes that British primacy could be restored in the Middle East, vigorous anti-
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colonial and nationalist movements within the region were making London’s position increasingly 
untenable.  When Egypt – the cornerstone of British power in the Middle East – fell in a nationalist 
revolution, it was clear that the United States could no longer rely on Whitehall to deliver security in the 
heart of the region.  In light of this revelation, Washington resolved to assume responsibility for the 
core states and so set about cultivating an American system to replace the ailing British position.  
Because of the reactive nature of this transition, the US ‘defence in depth’ strategy echoed key 
elements of the British system, not least the strategic imperative to establish partnerships with leading 
Arab regimes. 
 
Given the general direction of American Middle East strategy from 1945, the eventual decision 
to investigate the option of strategic partnership with Israel was by no means an inevitable 
development; despite steadily expanding US-Israeli ties, Washington’s early involvement with Tel Aviv 
had been predominantly a matter of silencing Israeli sabre-rattling, rather than grooming Israel for 
regional leadership.  The strategic reorientation towards Israel therefore represented a significant shift 
in American foreign policy.  Pointedly however, this change in direction was not a consequence of 
strategic pro-activity, but the same reactionary policy-making that had characterised the earlier 
Northern Tier and pro-Arab ‘defence in depth’ strategies:  As early as 1956, the difficulty of 
establishing a suitable US-Arab partnership was putting Washington under pressure to further revise 
America’s Middle East strategy.  Disillusioned by the Arab option but lacking viable alternatives, the 
United States was left wandering in a wilderness of strategic uncertainty which stretched through 
several administrations.  It was only in 1967, following Israel’s startling victory in the Six Day War, that 
the United States finally identified partnership with Israel as a viable solution to its strategic search and 
began to re-orientate its foreign policy accordingly. 
 
 
THE NORTHERN TIER SHIELD STRATEGY   
As early as 1945, the US State Department feared that Moscow’s strategic ambitions included 
an expansion into the Middle East.  This concern was confirmed during post-war negotiations, when 
the Soviets sought to consolidate their Eastern European buffer by securing access to Turkey’s 
strategic Dardanelles Straits, as well as the Iranian oilfields which had fuelled the Red Army’s 
sweeping Westward advance.1  Facing massive military and political pressure from the Soviet bloc, 
the Northern Tier states – Greece, Turkey and Iran – appealed to the US for protection.  Although it 
would be eight years before President Eisenhower would elaborate his Domino Theory, in 1946, 
Truman’s Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, warned that a failure to support the Northern Tier 
supplicants would bear catastrophic results for America.  The primary concern was Greece, where the 
                                                 
1 Douglas Little (2002), American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (IB Tauris & Co. Ltd: London), 
121; Scott Lucas (1999), Freedom’s War: The US crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 (Manchester University Press: 
Manchester), 7; DOS (1945), ‘Draft Memorandum for President Truman’, attached to ‘Dean Acheson to Secretary of State 
James F. Byrnes, October 9’, FRUS: 1945, 8, 45-8. 
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nationalist regime had been engaged in civil war with Soviet-backed Communist forces since 1944.  
As Acheson warned, “the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east.  It would also carry 
infection to Africa though Asia Minor and Egypt”.2   
  
Pre-empting George Kennan’s proposal for a strategy of containment by almost a year, 
Truman reacted to the Communist threat by authorising considerable support for the Greek 
nationalists, as well as the vulnerable Turkish and Iranian regimes, establishing strategic partnerships 
with the three states and the foundations of an anti-Soviet shield.  In February of the following year, 
Britain was forced to discontinue its sponsorship of several clients in the Eastern Mediterranean.  In 
light of Britain’s abdication and the very real Soviet pressure on the Northern Tier, the US had no 
choice but to respond directly to the threat if Washington wished to see Greece, Turkey and Iran 
remain Western assets.  Before long, the Northern Tier had become the backbone of America’s 
security strategy for the region directly south of the USSR.  By 1970, over ninety percent of American 
military aid to the Middle East – some $5,417 million – had been spent developing and maintaining the 
capacity of the Northern Tier troika to resist and deter a Soviet advance.3
 
It is noteworthy that America’s initial strategy for the Middle East did not extend beyond those 
states which had already come under direct threat from the Soviet Union.  The reason is simple: 
although the State Department believed that the Soviets aspired to hegemony throughout the oil-
producing Middle East, there was little evidence of an immediate threat to the core states and 
therefore the administration saw no reason to extend its strategic commitment beyond the Northern 
Tier shield.4  Although short-sighted, this decision matched the conventional wisdom of the day.  As 
Kennan explains, Americans believed that the Communist threat could be “contained by the adroit and 
vigilant application of counter-force” at strategic locations.5  By consolidating the Northern Tier troika, 
Truman had created a Western-orientated militarised frontier – a counter-force capable of containing 
the Soviet Union’s expansionist ambitions for the Middle East – and therefore could reasonably 
assume that strategic engagement elsewhere in the region was superfluous.   
 
In April 1949, Washington established another anti-Soviet shield: the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO).  Unlike the Northern Tier, NATO was a pre-meditated strategic development; a 
sophisticated umbrella alliance that not only provided a shield at the critical Soviet frontier, but also 
engaged the wider region in collective defence.  In addition to military security, NATO was 
instrumental in developing the economic and political security of Western Europe through its 
                                                 
2 Dean Acheson (1969), Present at the Creation (W.W. Norton & Co. Ltd: New York), 219. 
3 Aid figures correct for 1949-69.  Cathy Tackney (1972), ‘Dealing Arms in the Middle East.  Part 1: History and Strategic 
Considerations’, MERIP Reports, No. 8 (March-April), 4. 
4 DOD (1947), ‘The Situation up to 1957: Ten Year Projections, a note by the Secretaries for the Joint Strategic Plans 
Committee, December 11’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), Document Number CK3100346262, paragraph 9d.
5 George Kennan (1947), ‘Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, July, 566-82, Part III. 
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association with Point Four Aid and the European Recovery Program.  The success of the NATO 
model created the potential for a transformation of the Northern Tier shield from a simple barricade 
into a more comprehensive regional umbrella.  However, reticent to become entangled unnecessarily 
in the Middle East, Washington did not exploit this opportunity. 
 
The following spring, Truman’s own National Security Council published a new global strategy 
document that urged the administration to become more widely committed to strategic leadership.  
Emphasising the threat of Soviet ideological warfare, NSC 68 demanded that America frustrate the 
“hostile designs” of the enemy by committing to “the steady development of the moral and material 
strength of the free world” as a whole.6  The United States responded to this rally cry by diversifying its 
strategic commitments around the globe, especially in areas like Southeast Asia and Latin America 
which had been considered strategically peripheral by Kennan.7  However, despite its newfound 
mandate to global leadership, the Truman administration still did not seek to extend America’s role in 
the Middle East.  Ultimately, the administration saw no reason to take a lead in the core states; despite 
his foray into the Northern Tier, the president still considered the Middle East to be a British 
responsibility.  Whitehall’s well-established relationship with the region, not to mention its sprawling 
base in the Suez Canal Zone – then the largest military installation in the world – made Britain the 
obvious guardian of Middle Eastern security.8  In 1946, Britain’s post-war condition had forced 
America to take responsibility for a Soviet threat in the Eastern Mediterranean.  However, once the 
strategic vacuum along the Soviet frontier had been filled and the immediate threat neutralised, the 
United States saw no reason to further erode the British position.  With war brewing in Korea and 
tensions rising in Europe, the Americans were content to spread the strategic burden and leave the 
heart of the Middle East in the hands of their British allies.9
 
 
TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF DEFENSE IN DEPTH 
The problem with relying on Britain to stabilise the Middle East was that the deterioration of 
Whitehall’s influence in the region was not limited to the Northern Tier.  As early as the autumn of 
1945, British officials were publicly questioning the future of Britain’s role in the region’s core states.10  
The post-war government had hoped to revive its primacy in the Middle East through sponsorship of 
the Arab League, a post-colonial collective centred on Britain’s client regimes in Egypt, Iraq and 
                                                 
6 NSC (1950), ‘NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14’, FRUS: 1950, Vol. 1, 
‘Conclusions and Recommendations’. 
7 John Lewis Gaddis (2005), Strategies of Containments: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the 
Cold War, Revised and Expanded Edition (Oxford University Press: Oxford), 89. 
8 Institute of Commonwealth Studies, British Documents at the End of Empire Project, Series B, Part 4, Vol. I, 
http://commonwealth.sas.ac.uk/british.htm (accessed 04.10.06). 
9 DOS (1950), ‘Minutes of the US-UK Political Military Conversations, October 26’, FRUS: 1950, 5, 233-38; Douglas Little 
(2002), American Orientalism, 126. 
10 DOS (1945), ‘Draft Memorandum for President Truman’, 45-48. 
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Transjordan.  In partnership with the Middle East Supply Centre – an economic development agency 
established by Britain in 1941 – the League was expected to perpetuate Britain’s influence as well as 
form the “basis of stability” in the Middle East.11  However, these expectations were soon frustrated.  
The creation of Israel in 1948 sparked a blaze of Arab nationalism which challenged not only the 
Israeli imposition but also the continued presence of Britain and France.  Rather than defending British 
interests, the Arab League had become the champion of anti-colonialist nationalism.  Even Egypt, the 
cornerstone of Britain’s power in the Middle East, was growing increasingly hostile to Whitehall’s 
primacy. 
 
By 1949, Britain knew that it could not continue its duties in the Middle East without American 
assistance.  Indeed, during the US-UK talks that November, the British delegation expressly invited 
the United States “to assume greater responsibility in the region”.12  The US was reticent to accept the 
invitation, but did agree to participate in several cooperative projects, beginning with the Tripartite 
Declaration of 1950, which placed a limit on arms sales within the fractious Arab-Israeli Middle East.  
Although joining the Declaration was little more than a diplomatic gesture by Washington, the months 
that followed saw the United States drawn into ever greater strategic engagement with the region, as 
Britain’s growing inability to fulfil its strategic responsibilities in the heart of the Middle East forced 
Washington to increase its own involvement.  However, despite this escalating American participation, 
Truman did not move towards establishing an American strategy for the heart of the Middle East.  As 
far as the administration was concerned, American activity in the Middle East was a temporary 
expedient; a provisional arrangement which would refortify the British position with a view to returning 
full responsibility to Whitehall as soon as possible. 
 
It is no surprise therefore, that Whitehall’s proposed Allied Middle East Command (MEC) 
received mixed support from Washington.  Hoping to replicate the NATO model, the MEC was 
intended “to integrate Egypt and the Suez Base into a collective security pact” that would dominate 
both the Middle East and Africa.13  The Truman administration endorsed the British-led project on the 
grounds that such an alliance would indeed be strategically advantageous, arranging “modest 
amounts of military assistance to key Arab states” to facilitate its formation.14  However, while 
Washington was happy to provide economic resources and diplomatic gravity to support Britain’s 
strategic alliance, the Americans still expected Britain to shoulder the primary burden.  As official 
documents record, US objectives during the December 1951 deliberations included the “maintenance 
of UK primary military responsibility for the Middle East within the broader framework of the currently 
                                                 
11 Halford L. Hoskins (1953), ‘Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (March), 190. 
12 ‘Statement by the US and UK Groups’, 14 November 1949, FRUS: 1949, 6, 61-64; Douglas Little (2002), American 
Orientalism, 124. 
13 Barry Rubin, ‘America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Spring), 76. 
14 Douglas Little (2002), American Orientalism, 126. 
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quadripartite proposed Middle East Command”.15  Clearly, though the United States was in favour of 
establishing a defence in depth for the Middle East, the idea of taking a lead in achieving that strategy 
was alien to the Truman White House. 
 
As it transpired, America’s ambivalence was not the only obstacle to establishing the MEC.  
Despite Egypt’s anticipated central role in the Command, Cairo was not invited to initial negotiations.  
This mistake coincided with a string of diplomatic blunders that aggravated the Egyptians, leading 
Cairo to reject the MEC project outright.16  The State Department resolved to pursue plans for a 
Middle East collective despite Egypt’s disinterest, but the project faced an uphill struggle.   
 
After several months of fruitless negotiation, hopes of establishing an anti-Soviet collective for 
the Middle East and Africa were rekindled by the Egyptian revolution of July 1952.  Despite damaging 
relations with Whitehall by forcing the British-installed monarchy into exile, General Muhammad 
Naguib’s nationalist regime showed considerable interest in aligning Cairo with the US.  If the United 
States could convince Britain and Egypt to pool their resources, a firm foundation would be 
established from which to build a pro-Western alliance.  To allay Cairo’s fears of Egyptian 
subordination, revised proposals for the regional pact dropped the term ‘command’ from the name in 
favour of ‘defence organisation’.  Meanwhile, both the Marshall Plan and Point Four aid were extended 
to friendly regimes in the Middle East, including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel, in 
an effort to promote the embryonic Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO).17  Despite this 
apparent dynamism, however, Washington was slow to capitalise practically on Naguib’s interest.18
 
While negotiating an alliance between London and Cairo seemed an excellent idea, achieving 
such an agreement was quite different.  Promoting Naguib’s Egypt would inevitably undermine 
America’s existing arrangement with Britain by eroding Whitehall’s capacity to influence the region, as 
well as further aggravating those who had installed Egypt’s now exiled monarchy.  Moreover, post-
colonial Anglo-Egyptian hostility threatened the status of the primary Western security interest in the 
region – Britain’s sprawling Suez base.19  Of course, if Britain could be encouraged to cede the Suez 
facilities to Cairo, then the Anglo-Egyptian contest would be resolved and Cairo would be strong 
enough to dominate the region on America’s behalf.  However, the Arab nations, including Egypt, had 
yet to demonstrate willingness to employ their resources in defending the region from the Soviets.  As 
a White House report observed in January 1953, “it is doubtful whether the [Arab] leaders even with 
the best of intentions – so far largely absent from a Western point of view – can bring about the orderly 
                                                 
15 ‘Steering Group on Preparations for Talks between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, Negotiating Paper, TCT D-4/1 
c, December 31, 1951’, DDRS, Document Number: CK3100392121. 
16 Halford L. Hoskins (1953), ‘Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East’, 194. 
17 Halford L. Hoskins (1953), ‘Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East’, 190. 
18 Barry Rubin (1982), ‘America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957’, 76-7. 
19 Halford L. Hoskins (1953), ‘Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East’, 197. 
CHAPTER ONE: American Strategy and the Middle East, 1945-1968: 8 
Samuel E. Markey                                                                                                                                                The US-Israeli Partnership & America’s Search 
for Strategy in the Middle East, 1945-1974 
 
changes desirable to the West”.20  Indeed, it seemed eminently likely that Cairo would not simply 
renege on its duties as regional guardian, but actually abuse its power to make good on its threats 
against Israel. 
 
Truman’s fundamental belief that Britain should be responsible for the Middle East, combined 
with the complicating factor of the Arab-Israeli conflict, prevented the administration from shifting 
regional strategy away from the traditional British arrangement favoured since the mid-1940s.  
Certainly, America was much more involved in the Middle East than before, but this increased activity 
was inspired by the desire to rebuild Britain’s influence, not replace it.  Consequently, when Naguib’s 
ambassador, Major Ali Sabry, left the MEDO negotiations for Cairo, he returned “empty-handed and 
personally embittered” by Washington’s failure to elevate Egypt at the expense of Britain.21  
 
 
THE EISENHOWER DEFENCE IN DEPTH STRATEGY 
The accession of the Eisenhower administration in 1953 marked a significant new direction in 
American strategy, particularly in the Middle East.  In terms of global strategy, the new team argued 
that Truman had not done enough to challenge the Communist threat, but noted that the financial 
demands of a prolonged conflict were damaging America’s vitality.22  Determined to win the Cold War 
without sacrificing the American way of life, the Eisenhower-Dulles New Look strategy sought to 
increase pressure on the Communist bloc through nuclear brinksmanship and covert operations, 
including “propaganda, political action; economic warfare [and]… subversion”, while simultaneously 
reducing the cost of the Cold War for average Americans.23
 
The Middle East was certainly an area in which the United States could increase the pressure 
on the Soviets.  However, America’s existing strategy for the region had failed to establish systems 
capable of such a task.  The ongoing inability to achieve a convincing Middle East defence in depth 
under Britain’s strategic leadership forced the new administration to recognise that Whitehall was 
incapable of dominating the Middle East in the manner that had been previously believed.  Indeed, 
America’s reliance upon Britain’s position seemed to have caused the US more harm than good.  
While it was true that “the UK [had] the only easily available Western military forces for the initial 
protection of the Middle East in case of sudden attack”, John Foster Dulles’ meeting with President 
                                                 
20 ‘White House report on a US psychological warfare strategy program for the Middle East: Annex A (PSB D-22), January 8, 
1953’, DDRS, Document Number CK3100474054. 
21 Barry Rubin (1982), ‘America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957’, 78. 
22 ‘Solarium Project: Principle Points made by JFD, May 8, 1953’, US National Archives, Department of State, Lot 64 D 563: 
Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, Box 64, NSC 131/141/153; ‘Eisenhower speech to American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953’, Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1953, 183.  
23 ‘NSC 5412, Covert Operations, March 15, 1954’, Eisenhower Papers, White House Office Files: Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 7; ‘Eisenhower press conference, November 11, 1953’, Public Papers of the 
Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1953, 760. 
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Naguib in the spring of 1953 convinced the Secretary of State that Britain’s ongoing colonial presence, 
rather than being an asset to be preserved, was in fact the primary obstacle to achieving peace and 
stability in the region.24  Moreover, America’s efforts to maintain British primacy in the Middle East had 
been interpreted by some as an endorsement of colonialism, thereby tainting America’s image in the 
eyes of the local population.  For these reasons, Anglo-American cooperation in Middle East strategy 
was deemed to be “of increasingly doubtful value”.25  In light of these revelations, Secretary Dulles 
abandoned the Anglo-centric MEDO plan in favour of a new approach that would incorporate the heart 
of the Middle East directly into American strategy. 
 
In January, a report submitted to the White House had observed that the Middle East had 
become “a military vacuum, an economic slum, a political anachronism, and a house divided against 
itself.  The area [was] ripe for revolutionary change.”  The important question was whether the 
inevitable revolution would result in progress “favorable to the West” or whether it would follow a “path 
leading to chaos, fragmentation, and eventual Soviet control”.  Noting that “the ultimate end of US 
policy [was] to insure that the area and its resources [were] available to strengthen the free world”, the 
report concluded that the “the US [could] no longer play the role of the detached middle man or honest 
broker in [the region’s] political or international disputes”.26  If the Soviets were to be denied an 
opportunity to expand their influence, then America would have to take a more decisive role in the 
heart of the Middle East. 
 
In order to fill the Middle East vacuum, the administration needed to develop strategic 
partnerships within the region independent of Whitehall; just as the North Tier troika acted as 
America’s deputies along the Soviet frontier, the US now needed to cultivate an American system in 
the core states.  Crucially, despite the transition from British to American leadership, the strategic 
focus remained firmly on developing partnerships with the Arab states, not the Israelis.  To this end, 
the administration deployed comprehensive propaganda campaigns to reverse the tide of Arab anti-
Americanism.27  In those states where mere propaganda was insufficient to restore US-Arab relations 
– specifically Iran and Syria – covert operations sought to replace hostile incumbent regimes with pro-
American clients.28  Once a tentative pro-American position had been established, the administration 
set about cultivating an American-sponsored Middle East collective to provide stability and security to 
the region. 
                                                 
24 ‘White House report on a US psychological warfare strategy program for the Middle East: Annex A (PSB D-22), January 8, 
1953’, DDRS, Document Number CK3100474054; Fayez Sayegh (1959), ‘Arab Nationalism and Soviet-American Relations’, 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 324 (July), 104-6. 
25 Halford L. Hoskins (1953), ‘Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East’, 196. 
26 ‘White House report on a US psychological warfare strategy program for the Middle East: Annex A (PSB D-22), January 8, 
1953’. 
27 ‘NSC 155/1: US Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, 14 July 1953’, FRUS: 1952-54, 9, 397-98, 401-2. 
28 Stephen E. Ambrose (2003), Eisenhower: Soldier and President (Pocket Books: London), 342; Douglas Little (2003), ‘1949-
1958, Syria: Early Experiments in Covert Action’, Press for Conversion, No. 15, 13. 
CHAPTER ONE: American Strategy and the Middle East, 1945-1968: 10 
Samuel E. Markey                                                                                                                                                The US-Israeli Partnership & America’s Search 
for Strategy in the Middle East, 1945-1974 
 
 
 Although Egypt was the Middle East’s primary geo-strategic prize, the United States was 
uncertain how to harness Naguib’s nationalist regime to American strategy.  In an effort to develop 
closer ties with Cairo, the Eisenhower administration endorsed petitions for Britain to cede control of 
the Suez Canal base to Egypt.  In truth, the advent of thermonuclear weapons had rendered Britain’s 
sprawling installation indefensible and therefore largely “obsolete”.29  Nevertheless, America’s pro-
Egyptian position on this popular issue allowed Washington to identify itself visibly with Arab self-
determination, creating vital political capital for future diplomatic efforts.  In February 1954, the 
charismatic Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser replaced Naguib as leader of Egypt.  Nasser’s ability to 
dominate regional affairs, including the disolution of the radical Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
impressed the Eisenhower administration.30  However, the United States remained hesitant to move 
too swiftly towards a partnership with Cairo; such a development would have risked antagonising the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the British government.  Consequently, with US-Egyptian relations 
now established, America turned its attention to the region’s second geostrategic pivot: Iraq.   
 
Given the intense rivalry between Egypt and Iraq, Eisenhower’s ambition of an American 
system that encompassed both states was deeply problematic.  The Baghdad Pact, an anti-Soviet 
collective that emerged in 1955, seemed to promise a solution to these problems and therefore 
received considerable attention from the administration.  The Pact welcomed any power interested in 
the promotion of “peace, stability and well-being” in the Middle East, but, to Washington’s frustration, a 
rare few actually took up the invitation.31  One reason for this limited interest was Britain’s participation 
in the Pact – a presence that gave the collective an unhelpfully neo-colonial image.  Ultimately, only 
those states ranged along the Soviet frontier – Turkey, Iran and Pakistan – showed any interest in 
joining the anti-Soviet collective (and even these only signed up following the promise of American 
aid); despite Washington’s best efforts, the influential Arab regimes of the lower Middle East remained 
entirely detached from the project.32  In light of this failure, the US disentangled itself from the 
enterprise in pursuit of more productive opportunities elsewhere in the Arab world.33
 
 Having failed to draw the core states into an American system through Iraq, the administration 
returned its focus to Egypt and Colonel Nasser.  However, while the State Department had been 
championing the Baghdad Pact, US-Egyptian relations had seriously deteriorated.  In August 1954, 
Washington had promised Nasser a gift of $40 million in military and economic aid as a reward for his 
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dissolution of the radical Muslim Brotherhood and peaceful annexation of Britain’s Suez base.  
However, to the consternation of Nasser (as well as President Eisenhower and CIA Director Alan 
Dulles), the Secretary of State subsequently decided to withhold the package as leverage towards 
securing an Egyptian-Israeli settlement and establishing an American Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG) in Cairo.  Since acquiesence to these conditions would have inevitably provoked 
domestic opposition in Egypt, Nasser was forced to reject the new arrangement.34  To make matters 
worse, on the last day in December, 1954, Secretary Dulles responded to Nasser’s ongoing non-
compliance by suspending arms shipments to Egypt.   
 
The inauguration of the Baghdad Pact was the final insult.  Despite America’s decision not to 
join the Pact, Nasser saw the alliance as an American effort to promote the Iraqi regime at the 
expense of Egypt’s traditional pre-eminence.  In September 1955, angered by America’s empty 
promises and facing mounting domestic pressure to modernise the antiquated Egyptian military, 
Nasser made the controversial decision to approach Moscow for assistance.  To Washington’s 
dismay, the Kremlin welcomed Nasser’s appeal and swiftly arranged for Czechoslovakia to trade 
“$200 million in [Soviet] military equipment for Egyptian cotton”.35  Eisenhower’s hopes of a strategic 
partnership with Egypt were fading fast.  In 1956, Congress flatly refused to finance construction of the 
Aswan Dam, despite the fact that the project had the potential to either “tie Egypt to America for a 
decade”, or push Cairo further towards the Soviet Union.36  By late spring it was clear that, if America 
was ever to secure a partnership with Nasser, something radical needed to be done; if Nasser could 
not be seduced by promises, perhaps he could be coerced into compliance? 
 
Project Omega was intended to pressurise Nasser into renouncing the Soviet Union by 
threatening to excommuniate him from the Free world.  However, the State Department had seriously 
overestimated Nasser’s desire to join the West and underestimated the vitality of the Soviet Union as 
an alternative patron.  Rather than convincing the wayward Nasser to abandon his pretensions of 
friendship with Moscow, Project Omega pushed Cairo further towards the Kremlin.  In July 1956, 
Eisenhower’s hopes of a US-Egyptian strategic partnership were finally shelved when Nasser forcibly 
nationalised the Suez Canal.  Although the administration chastised Britain, France and Israel for their 
subsequent invasion of Egypt, firmly emphasising that the United States was now the leading player in 
the Middle East, it was clear that America had lost patience with the unruly Nasser.  However, not only 
was Nasser America’s best hope, he was also their last. 
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STRATEGIC UNCERTANTY 
The Suez crisis was simply the prologue to a string of events that seriously weakened 
American hopes of establishing a US-Arab partnership and undermined Washington’s confidence in 
the prevailing strategy.  In 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR).  
Despite the fact that the union was championed by Syrian nationalists, intent on reducing the influence 
of the Syrian Communist Party in Damascus, the United States interpreted the new arrangement as a 
further descent into radicalism.  That same year, in Baghdad, Nasserite officers launched a bloody 
coup against the Hashemite regime, decapitating not only the Iraqi royal family, but also the Baghdad 
Pact.  The collapse of nascent American positions in Egypt and Iraq left American Middle East 
strategy bereft of direction.  In keeping with his pro-active approach to the region, Eisenhower 
responded to the spate of revolutions by dispatching American forces to Lebanon in 1958 in defence 
of the moderate government of Camille Chamoun.  However, while this intervention was successful in 
preserving the pro-Western position in Beirut, America’s regional strategy had suffered a considerable 
blow.  With the geopolitical pivots of Egypt and Iraq unavailable, where else could Washington hope to 
find a suitable strategic partner?  Plagued by strategic uncertainty and foreign distractions, the 
American ambition of establishing a prevailing position in the heart of the Middle East seemed futile. 
 
The primary challenge facing the American defence in depth strategy was bridging the 
distance between Washington’s understanding of the Cold War, and that of the Arab world.  Unlike 
Americans, most Arabs did not consider the Soviet Union to pose a serious threat to the Middle East.  
Still finding its feet after centuries of colonial subjugation, the Arab world was largely pre-occupied with 
regional politics, not global affairs; regional enemies were considered of much greater concern than 
Moscow and the lingering remnants of colonialism more troublesome than the spectre of International 
Communism.  Consequently, Washington’s energetic efforts to ‘secure’ the Middle East for the Free 
world were met with scepticism by indigenous audiences, which frequently interpreted America’s 
ambition as neo-colonialism.  Fearing a return to foreign subordination, the Arab world sought refuge 
in the anti-imperialism of militant nationalist and pan-Arabist movements.37  More controversially, 
several regimes followed Nasser’s lead in making overtures towards Moscow, including the Syrians, 
who signed a “wheat-for-weapons deal with the Kremlin” in August 1957.38  It should be noted that 
very few Arab regimes displayed real sympathy for Communist ideology; the arrangement with 
Moscow was simply a practical outworking of “active positive neutrality”.39  However, as far as the US 
was concerned, such details were inconsequential – then (as now) Arab radicalism was primarily 
defined in terms of opposition to US policy.40
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 America’s strategic uncertainly continued unabated during the Kennedy years, not least 
because the administration was preoccupied with pressing situations elsewhere in the world; amidst 
crises in Berlin and Cuba, and wars of national liberation in Africa and Southeast Asia, the new 
administration had little time for the question of strategic direction in the Middle East.41  That being 
said, the Kennedy team did not abandon the Middle East.  Despite Nasser’s ongoing trouble-making, 
the instability of America’s strategic position and shortage of serious alternatives, forced the Kennedy 
White House to renew efforts to engage Egypt in American strategy, albeit with equally limited 
success.  Having lost Iraq and frustrated by Egypt, Washington’s attentions turned briefly to Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Politically conservative and diplomatically pro-West, Saudi Arabia seemed an ideal candidate 
for American partnership.  Unlike most Middle Eastern states, Saudi Arabia had achieved 
independence early, breaking free of Imperial Britain in 1927.  This had not been the end of Anglo-
Saudi relations however and the discovery of oil in 1938 cemented a lasting bond between Riyadh and 
the Western powers.  In 1951, the US airfield at Dhahran, constructed in 1944 to safeguard the nearby 
ARAMCO facility, was incorporated into the Strategic Air Command network, making it “the largest US 
installation between Germany and Korea”.42  During the Kennedy era, Saudi Arabia was ruled by King 
Saud bin Abdul Aziz.  Despite his debauchery and domestic unpopularity, Saud’s staunch opposition 
to radicalism – as demonstrated by his response to the Yemeni civil war – attracted the attention of the 
US.43  On 27 September 1962, Nasserite revolutionaries deposed the newly-crowned King 
Muhammad al-Badr in North Yemen, sparking a six year conflict between conservative and radical 
elements.  Eager to further Arab nationalism (and reassert his radical credentials among his critics), 
Nasser dispatched seventy thousand Egyptian troops to assist Yemen’s Republican forces.  The 
Kennedy administration feared not only the potential loss of another state to radical nationalism, but 
also that Nasser’s deployment could “serve as a springboard for further Egyptian adventures in Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, or Britain’s Aden protectorate”.44  To Washington’s relief, King Saud was equally 
determined not to see a proliferation of radicalism, dispatching Saudi troops to reinforce the Yemeni 
Royalist camp. 
 
However, with radical nationalism sweeping the Middle East, the longevity of a US-Saudi 
partnership could not be guaranteed.  Jordan, another key Western position, had narrowly survived a 
radical Palestinian coup that year.  How long could Riyadh resist revolution?  Whilst fighting in the 
Yemeni civil war, some Saudi pilots had defected to Cairo.  Even some members of the royal family 
were believed to have Nasserite sympathies, raising serious questions over the future of Riyadh’s 
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suitability as an American strategic partner.45  In light of these questions, partnership with Saudi 
Arabia was not pursued with full vigour by the US; Washington did continue to supply arms to Riyadh, 
but those arms were deliberately limited towards counter-insurgency rather than foreign intervention.46  
America’s quest for a strategic partnership was back to square one.  It was not until 1967 – over a 
decade after the Suez crisis threw American Middle East strategy spiralling – that a new direction was 
finally identified; strategic partnership with Israel. 
 
 
JOHNSON, ISRAEL AND THE ‘NEXT BEST’ STRATEGY 
The state of Israel was founded in May 1948.  However, despite playing an integral role in 
Israel’s creation, and contrary to popular belief, the United States did not embrace the fledgling state 
as a strategic asset until the late 1960s.  Truman’s involvement with Israel’s creation was not inspired 
by the desire to establish a pro-American platform in the Middle East, but simple humanitarian need.  
After all, Truman had already established an American strategy for the Middle East – the Northern Tier 
– prior to 1948, and showed little interest in further strategic expansion.  Situated firmly within Britain’s 
strategic remit, the creation of Israel was not the work of American strategists, but the result of 
extensive lobbying by Zionist groups and the beleaguered British government. 
 
Even during Suez crisis and subsequent nationalist revolutions, when US-Arab relations were 
at their worst, Washington made no effort to abandon the Arabs in favour of an arrangement with 
Israel; America may have been committed to Israel’s survival, but it did not consider Tel Aviv a viable 
alternative for strategic partnership.  In the context of the modern US-Israeli arrangement, it is 
surprising to discover the extent to which the United States sought to distance itself from Israel.  For 
example, following the first Arab-Israeli war, Washington was so concerned “that Israel controlled too 
much territory“, that “State Department officials quietly encouraged the United Nations to draw 
boundaries more favourable to the Arabs”.47  Truman’s successor was even less enthusiastic about 
supporting Israel.  President Eisenhower, a veteran of the North African campaigns and committed 
Arabist, believed that Israel’s conflict with the Arab world had allowed the Soviet Union to “leapfrog” 
America’s carefully constructed Northern Tier defences and “establish a foothold” in the Middle East.  
In this way, Israel, far from being considered a strategic asset, was deemed “an obstacle to the global 
strategy for the containment of communism”.48
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America’s desire to remain detached from Israel continued throughout the late 1950s and 
early 1960s.  However, US-Israeli ties became increasingly unavoidable as Israel’s traditional patrons 
– Britain and France – gradually withdrew their support for Tel Aviv, seeking renewed influence in the 
Arab world.  The declining Anglo-French contribution to Israeli security was especially problematic in 
light of the escalating Soviet patronage of Israel’s Arab enemies: by the end of the 1950s, arms 
shipments to the Arab bloc had rocketed from a value of $40 million per annum to some $200 
million.49  Tel Aviv looked to America for support, but the Eisenhower administration – committed to 
establishing a US-Arab arrangement – proved unforthcoming.50  Eventually, the US grudgingly agreed 
to provide Israel with radar technology to compensate for Egypt’s Soviet-supplied all-weather 
bombers, but staunchly refused to supply offensive systems, such as Hawk surface-to-air missiles.  
Dissatisfied, the Israelis resorted to diplomatic manoeuvring in an effort to secure comprehensive US 
support. 
 
In the spring of 1961, the Kennedy White House was alarmed by reports that Israel was 
engaged in purchasing sophisticated medium-range French bombers capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons.51  Aside from the fact that introducing nuclear devices to the Middle East risked 
transforming Arab-Israeli skirmishing into a global crisis, Washington feared that the presence of an 
Israeli nuclear deterrent would drive the Arab regimes further towards the Soviet Union.  While the CIA 
noted that Moscow was unlikely to provide its Arab clients with nukes of their own, the threat of an 
Israeli bomb would certainly see the Arabs becoming more dependent on Soviet arms shipments and 
could even facilitate the deployment of Soviet personnel on Arab soil.52  This eventuality could not be 
permitted; Israel needed to be discouraged of its nuclear ambitions at all costs.  In fact, Tel Aviv was 
well aware of America’s concerns.  At talks in May 1961, Ben Gurion reminded Kennedy that Israel 
would have no need to develop a nuclear deterrent if the US were willing to supply the IDF with the 
necessary arms to defend Israel from Arab aggression, specifically, Hawk surface-to-air missiles to 
combat the Soviet MiGs which had recently arrived in Cairo.  Like his predecessors, Kennedy was 
reticent to see America become Israel’s arsenal, for fear of alienating strategically useful Arab 
regimes, but the potential consequences of Israel’s nuclear ambitions were equally unpalatable.  
Fourteen months later, after much negotiation and the arrival of substantial new shipments of Soviet 
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arms in Egypt, Kennedy agreed to provide Israel with the missiles, setting a precedent that effectively 
“opened the floodgate of weapons sales to Israel”.53
 
The assassination of JFK in 1963 brought Lyndon B. Johnson to power, a man who owed 
much of his political success to America’s Jewish voters.  However, while Johnson is correctly 
remembered as a firm friend of Israel, his administration did not immediately pursue a strategic 
arrangement with Tel Aviv.  Despite the ongoing failure to establish a prevailing American position 
through the Arab bloc, not to mention America’s blossoming relationship with Israel, LBJ did not 
consider Tel Aviv a viable strategic ally during the mid-1960s, as emphasised by his non-cooperation 
with Israel over the controversial project to divert the Jordan River in 1964.54  Still haunted by the fear 
that Israel might introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East, American arms sales continued to 
expand, but such deals were intended to silence Israeli sabre-rattling rather than equip Tel Aviv to lead 
the region; the idea that the tiny Zionist state could dominate affairs beyond its borders was as yet 
unthinkable.55  However, events in 1967 would radically alter America’s regional paradigm. 
 
In June 1967, Israel launched a massive pre-emptive strike against Arab military positions in 
Egypt and Syria, destroying three hundred Egyptian aircraft and some two-thirds of Syria’s air force on 
the ground.56  After six days of heavy fighting, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had captured the Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the entire Sinai Peninsula, thereby tripling the size of 
Israel’s territory.  In a marked contrast to Eisenhower’s response to Israel’s 1956 Suez enterprise, the 
Johnson administration applauded the campaign.  Indeed, 
Johnson seems to have taken vicarious pleasure from Israel’s ability to thwart an Arab war or national 
liberation not unlike the one America faced in Vietnam.  Nor was the Texan unhappy about Tel Aviv’s 
humiliation of Nasser, who “had used the issue of Israel and the tragic plight of the refugees to advance 
personal ambitions and to achieve the dominance of Arab radicals over Arab moderates”.57
Although declassified British documents reveal that the Egyptian military was significantly weakened 
by its involvement in Yemen and the Syrian armed forces were barely sufficient for peace-time, the 
swift and decisive nature of the IDF’s victory in the face of apparently overwhelming odds and 
sophisticated Soviet-supplied weaponry generated a belief – as popular in the US as in Israel – that 
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the IDF was virtually invincible on the battlefield.58  After decades of assuming that the numerically 
superior Arab states held the key to Middle Eastern geopolitics, Israel’s startling victory forced US 
policy-makers to re-evaluate America’s emphasis on a strategic arrangement with the Arab bloc.  This 
is not to say that the administration immediately transferred its allegiance to Tel Aviv, but the potential 
for a US-Israeli partnership was finally realised.  Following the war, Johnson tacitly endorsed Israel’s 
occupation of the captured territory by delaying settlement negotiations on the basis of the Israeli 
argument that the Arabs were not ready to accept a lasting peace.59  Meanwhile, the victorious IDF 
were rewarded with new weapons contracts, including America’s top-of-the-range F4 Phantom jets. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
For more than twenty years after the formation of Israel, American administrations had sought 
to achieve establish a prevailing position in the Middle East through partnership with the Arab bloc.  
However, by the late 1960s, the repeated failure to properly engage an Arab regime in this manner 
had effectively rendered the strategy obsolete.  In fact, between 1958 and 1967, there was no clear 
candidate for American strategic partnership.  Finally, in 1967, Washington was presented with an 
alternative option: the possibility of strategic partnership with the ‘invincible’ Israelis. 
 
Having identified the potential of a US-Israeli arrangement, the Johnson administration went 
some way towards developing this ‘next-best’ strategy.  However, when the administration left office in 
December 1968, American Middle East strategy was still hazy.  Certainly, cooperation between 
Washington and Tel Aviv had expanded significantly since 1967, but the US had yet to commit to a 
formal partnership with Israel.  If the US was to preserve Western influence and achieve its objective 
of stability in the Middle East, this ill-defined approach needed to be developed into a coherent region-
wide strategy.  With Johnson gone, the task of delineating this new strategy fell to his successor, 
Richard Milhous Nixon. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY UNDER NIXON, 1969-1970 
 
 
On Nixon’s accession to the presidency, the State Department presented the White House 
with a series of documents urging the new administration to build on Johnson’s legacy and transform 
America’s hazy, prevailing approach to the Middle East into a coherent regional strategy.  Three 
developments were of particular concern: escalating Soviet opportunism throughout the region, the 
continued proliferation of ‘radical’ Arab regimes, and the problem of Palestinian nationalism.  Although 
hardly novel issues, these developments had blossomed since 1967, exploiting fertile circumstances 
to further their causes and threaten America’s continued position in the region.   
 
Delineating a decisive regional strategy for the region was an essential first step towards 
countering this three-fold threat, but remarkably, Nixon – distracted by ambitions in Southeast Asia 
and perhaps unconvinced by the strategic direction pioneered by Johnson – did nothing to answer this 
urgent need during the first year and a half of his presidency.  Indeed, despite the recommendations of 
the State Department, Nixon sidelined the issue of Middle East strategy entirely, leaving American 
activity in the region to drift aimlessly.  As a result of this negligence, the various threats identified by 
the State Department continued to expand unchecked, with Soviet opportunism reaching 
unprecedented levels by the summer of 1970 and Arab-Israeli hostilities threatening to destabilise the 
entire region. 
 
 
THE THREE-FOLD THREAT 
Soviet Opportunism 
The Soviet Union was constantly seeking to advance Moscow’s position at Washington’s 
expense and found plentiful opportunities to do so in the Middle East thanks to America’s prolonged 
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period of strategic uncertainty towards the pivotal region.  While Washington struggled to maintain 
cordial relations with all but the most conservative regimes, the Kremlin had cultivated extensive 
influence through the provision of military and economic assistance to Arab nationalists like Nasser 
and Salah Jadid of Syria.  This arrangement was further consolidated in 1967 by the Six Day War and 
the advent of Johnson’s ‘next best’ strategy.  Despite going some way towards founding a firm 
American position in the Middle East, Johnson’s move towards a pro-Israel posture had an 
antagonistic effect on US-Arab relations.1  Disillusioned by America, but in dire need of economic and 
military assistance, the Arab bloc was forced to move towards greater dependence on the Soviet 
Union.  By the start of Nixon’s presidency, the leading Arab states – Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria – 
had received “an estimated 3.1 billion dollars” in Soviet military investment.2  Significantly, this 
investment included an increasing number of Soviet personnel being deployed in Arab states; 
following the war, the number of Soviet “military technicians and advisors stationed in the UAR and 
Syria more than doubled”.  These deployments, which totalled “over 3,500” in January 1969, 
advanced the regional influence of the Kremlin considerably and were of grave concern to State 
Department officials.3
 
The glaring imbalance between American and Soviet diplomatic successes in the Middle East 
was a real problem for the US.  As one State Department staff study lamented: 
Moscow enjoys close ties with the UAR, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the People's Republic of Southern 
Yemen... It has normal relations with Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait and is probing to develop a position 
in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. While the United States has no diplomatic relations with any 
radical Arab regime, except PRSY, the Soviets are extending significant aid to all.4  
Pointedly, this energetic Soviet diplomacy was not limited to consolidating Moscow’s position in 
established anti-American regimes like Egypt and Syria; it also sought to exploit Washington’s lack of 
strategic clarity to undermine America’s relationship with its own regional allies.  Consequently, in 
1969, the Soviet Union’s ongoing “good neighbour policy” towards Turkey gave rise to “high-level 
visits, increased commercial relations and acceptance of Soviet economic aid” by NATO’s 
easternmost member-state.5  In Greece, Moscow sought to exploit tensions between Washington and 
Athens, whose allocation of US military assistance had been sharply reduced in recent years, by 
fostering “trade, aid, cultural exchanges and diplomacy” with the Greek government.6  Even Iran, 
America’s key client in the Persian Gulf, developed relations with Moscow.  By 1972, despite close 
                                                 
1 Stephen E Ambrose & Douglas G Brinkley (1997), Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 8th revised edition 
(Penguin: London), 211. 
2 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), 
Document Number: CK3100552758, section I, subsection 3c. 
3 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section I, subsection 3c. 
4 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), 
Document Number: CK3100545667, subsection 2A. 
5 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, subsection 3A. 
6 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, subsection 3A. 
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links with Washington, Tehran had become “the fourth largest recipient of Soviet economic aid and the 
second largest recipient of East European aid”.7   
 
In addition to developing indirect influence through the diplomatic offensive, the Soviets also 
sought to counter US influence through direct displays of power.  Since the Second World War, the 
American Sixth Fleet had dominated the Mediterranean Sea and served as an imposing reminder of 
US power.  During the late 1960s however, the Kremlin established its own Mediterranean fleet to rival 
and harass the American force.  Not only did this new Soviet fleet limit the flexibility of American naval 
activity, it also served to advance Soviet influence in Arab states.  Although Moscow did not seek 
formal base rights along the Mediterranean coast, an informal agreement with the UAR opened 
“operating facilities to Soviet naval units at Alexandria and Port Said, and permitted the use of airfields 
to Soviet units”.8  State Department analysts predicted that other Arab governments would follow suit, 
notably the Algerians, who possessed the former French naval facility at Mers-el-Kebir.9  Such 
developments were of genuine concern to Washington.  A 1969 Staff Study of regional developments 
noted that “the hostile orientation of the UAR and Algeria [was] already seen as a significant threat 
against NATO lines of communication through the Mediterranean”; the combination of that hostility 
with a “more or less permanent” Soviet military base “would constitute a serious risk to Western 
security”, especially if that facility possessed nuclear missiles.10
 
The Soviet naval expansion was inspired, at least in part, by the British announcement in 
January 1968 that Whitehall planned to abdicate its possessions east of Suez by 1971.  Hoping to 
exploit the power vacuum created by Britain’s impending retreat, “Soviet fleet units… paid two visits to 
the Red Sea and Persian Gulf ports” within twelve months of Whitehall’s announcement; “the first 
manifestation of Russian naval strength in these waters in over sixty years”.11  With Washington 
paralysed by strategic ambiguity, the Kremlin undoubtedly hoped that the presence of a Soviet fleet in 
the Gulf would symbolically mirror the British Royal Navy, thereby encouraging a straightforward 
transition from British to Soviet hegemony when the time came.  As in the Mediterranean, the key to 
the success of this strategy was naval bases.  These bases would not only provide shelter for Soviet 
vessels, they would also serve as geo-political beachheads from which Soviet influence could spread 
throughout the region.  The two largest players in the Gulf, Iraq and Iran, had already developed ties 
with Moscow; the coming retreat of the British from Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States would create 
further opportunities for Soviet ambition in the oil-rich peninsula.12  Without a decisive regional 
                                                 
7 CIA (1972), ‘Intelligence Memorandum: Moscow and the Persian Gulf, 12 May’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Hills, 
Michigan), Document Number CK3100228370, paragraph 2. 
8 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, subsection 3A. 
9 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, subsection 3A. 
10 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, subsection 3A, subsection 1B. 
11 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section I, subsection 3e. 
12 CIA (1972), ‘Intelligence Memorandum: Moscow and the Persian Gulf, 12 May,’ paragraph 11. 
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strategy to counter the Soviet diplomatic offensive and naval expansion, the future of America’s 
position in the Middle East looked bleak. 
 
 
‘Radical’ Arab Nationalism 
The Soviets were not alone in perceiving Britain’s colonial retreat as an opportunity to expand; as 
State Department analysts warned Nixon, Arab nationalists were equally keen to exploit Whitehall’s 
abdication.  Earlier in the decade, Yemen had been granted independence from Britain, only to be 
plunged into civil conflict by opportunistic nationalist elements.  Western analysts feared that the soon-
to-be independent Gulf states might suffer the same fate, leaving Western oil interests at risk.  These 
fears were compounded by the ongoing collapse of moderate positions elsewhere in the region.  
Indeed, by the end of the decade, almost every significant Arab state was subject to a ‘radical’ 
regime.13  As Under-Secretary of State Walt Rostow commented in a retrospective article:   
A continuation of the process, which could involve the Nasserization of Jordan, the Lebanon…, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, would present… a security crisis of major, and potentially 
catastrophic, proportions.14
If Washington hoped to avoid such a security crisis, the new administration would need to identify a 
firm, coherent strategy which was capable of countering the march of nationalism and revitalising the 
ailing Western position.  Moreover, it would need to develop an effective response to the greatest 
source of nationalist aggression within the Middle East: the issue of Palestine. 
 
 
The Palestinian Problem 
The controversy over ownership of Palestine had raged since Israel’s creation in 1948, but 
reached a new intensity following Israel’s annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the Six Day 
War.  In 1964, Nasser had established the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to champion “the 
right of the Palestinian Arab people to its sacred homeland”.15  Although the Egyptian’s intention was 
to establish a “noisy but relatively harmless organisation” which would satisfy the ideological 
expectations of his nationalist brethren, without “translating his own anti-Israeli rhetoric prematurely 
into action”, the PLO and the plethora of fedayeen splinter groups which emerged from it refused to be  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Figure 1. 
14 Eugene V. Rostow (1971), ‘The Middle Eastern Crisis in the Perspective of World Politics’, International Affairs, April, 280; 
cited in Cathy Tackney (1972), ‘Dealing Arms in the Middle East.  Part 1: History and Strategic Considerations’, MERIP Reports, 
No. 8 (March-April), 10. 
15 Palestine Liberation Organization (1964), ‘Statement of Proclamation of the Organization, Jerusalem, 28 May’, 
http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/doc_three.html (accessed 05.12.06). 
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Figure 1: Map of ‘radical’ Arab regimes, 1970. 
Territories due for independence in 1971 depicted by dotted line. 
Primary oil-fields depicted by dashed line. 
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contained.16  Following the war, with approximately a million Palestinians now living under Israeli rule 
and a further million in exile, fedayeen activity escalated dramatically.17  Indeed, during the few short 
months between the end of the war and January 1968, forty-eight “serious” terrorist attacks were 
perpetrated by Palestinian insurgents, as well as countless minor operations.18  As the situation 
worsened, State Department officials feared for the stability of Middle Eastern geopolitics. 
 
Although the “active strength” of the fedayeen was fairly limited – probably less than five 
thousand – their symbolic significance was far greater.19  After June 1967, Palestinian fedayeen were 
the only Arabs still engaged in the armed struggle with Israel, a fact which by itself was enough to 
attract sympathisers from throughout the Arab bloc.  More significantly however, the fedayeen were 
enjoying considerable success in their struggle against the Israeli occupation, as the PLO’s fierce 
stand during the battle of Karameh demonstrated.20  Arab nationalists, bruised by their experiences in 
the Six Day War, revelled in the fedayeen’s ability to harass the IDF and inflict injury on Israel.  Eager 
to assist the iconic fedayeen in their fight, the Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi regimes each supplied arms 
and training to the guerrillas, while financial support flooded in from “governments and individual 
donors all over the Arab world”.21  By the time Nixon arrived in the White House, foreign sponsorship 
had transformed the Palestinian problem from a minority cause into a major issue.  With “miserable 
refugee camps” brimming with embittered young Arabs and military hardware readily available, 
fedayeen terrorism knew no limits.22   
 
Traditionally, the West had relied upon moderate Jordan to curb Palestinian nationalism.  
However by the end of the 1960s, with violence intensifying, this arrangement was becoming 
increasingly inadequate.  Despite his participation in the Six Day War, King Hussein’s pro-Western 
posture and eagerness to establish a peace with Israel had drawn heavy criticism from Hussein’s 
nationalist neighbours.  The most vocal of criticisms however, sprung from within Jordan, where 
Palestinian refugees railed against Hussein’s efforts to suppress their nationalist ambitions.  With his 
credibility as an Arab leader waning, and sixty-five percent of his country’s population gunning for him, 
Hussein faced a simple choice: appease the nationalists or lose his throne.23
 
                                                 
16 Jeremy Bowen (2003), Six Days: How the 1967 war shaped the Middle East (Simon & Schuster UK Ltd: London), 22; Douglas 
Little (1993), ‘The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-68’, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 25, 574. 
17 The Palestine Centre (n.d.), ‘Distribution of the Palestinian Population and Jewish Settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Since 
1967’, http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/stats/dist_pop_67.html (accessed 06.01.07). 
18 Jeremy Bowen (2003), Six Days: How the 1967 war shaped the Middle East, 354. 
19 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section I, subsection 5. 
20 For more on this battle, see Jeremy Bowen (2003), Six Days: How the 1967 war shaped the Middle East, 356. 
21 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section I, subsection 5. 
22 Jeremy Bowen (2003), Six Days: How the 1967 war shaped the Middle East, 355. 
23 Shelia Ryan & Joe Stork (1972), ‘US and Jordan: Thrice-Rescued Throne’, MERIP Reports, No. 7, February, 5. 
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The State Department was well aware of the vulnerability of Hussein’s position.  In January 
1969, a report warned that “if within the coming year the Jordanian government is unable to negotiate 
an acceptable peace settlement [with Israel], the fedayeen can be expected to make a move against 
the Hashemite regime”.24  Such a development could prove catastrophic for America’s regional 
ambitions.  In addition to containing Palestinian ambitions, King Hussein had been very effective at 
discouraging nationalism elsewhere in the Arab bloc, thanks to the considerable influence of Jordan’s 
legendary Arab Legion, which provided training and advisors to several fledgling Arab states.25  If the 
fedayeen succeeded in toppling Hussein and Jordan collapsed, then America’s already weakened 
regional position would lose an important ally.  More importantly however, the collapse of the 
Hashemite regime would throw the geography of the Middle East into chaos, as different groups 
sought to benefit from Hussein’s demise.  Regardless whether it was Palestinians, Syrians or Iraqis 
who succeeded in annexing territory from Jordan’s ruins, the State Department expected Israel to 
respond by securing a “territorial advantage on the East Bank”, thereby “precipitating a crisis which 
could well lead to a great power confrontation”.26  Since such a confrontation was obviously 
undesirable, it was in America’s interests to prevent a Palestinian uprising.  However, if this was to be 
achieved, the new administration needed to delineate a decisive strategy that could either resolve or 
more effectively contain the Palestinian problem. 
 
 
NIXON’S STRATEGIC NEGLIGENCE 
State Department officials made it abundantly clear to Nixon that America was approaching a 
crisis in the Middle East.  Over a decade of strategic uncertainty, followed by several years of strategic 
ambiguity had created the dangerous illusion that the United States was not fully committed to the 
pivotal region.  As Henry Kissinger observed,  
because of our obvious past and present reluctance (with the one exception of Lebanon in 1958) to back 
up diplomatic agreements or political friendships with a US military presence [our enemies have come to 
believe that the US is]… either unwilling or unable to do anything [to preserve our regional interests].27
Encouraged by Washington’s apparent disinterest, Soviet opportunism had become increasingly 
ambitious, even to the point of targeting the very foundations of American regional influence – the 
Northern Tier and Sixth Fleet.  Meanwhile, Washington’s failure to respond firmly to nationalist 
                                                 
24 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section III, subsection C1. 
25 By the late 1960s, Jordan was providing “over 100 military engineers and advisors to Oman, an undisclosed number of 
advisors and officers to Bahrain, 50 officers to the Yemen Arab Republic, and over 400 officers, including the armed forces’ 
chief of staff, to the United Arab Emirates.  Joe Stork (1980), ‘The Carter Doctrine and US Bases in the Middle East’, MERIP 
Reports, No. 90 (September), 10. 
26 William B. Quandt (1971), ‘The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 48; 
DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section I, subsection 1d. 
27 Henry Kissinger (1969), ‘Attachment to Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President 
Nixon: The Modern World, A Single “Strategic Theatre”, September 29’, National Archives: Nixon Presidential Material, NSC 
Files, Box, 397, Subject Files, A Strategic Overview, section B. III: 1, 4. 
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subversion had allowed a continued proliferation of radical regimes and weakened American credibility 
amongst its remaining clients; “from the point of view of the moderate Arabs it must [have appeared] 
that friendship with the US [did] not offer protection and [did] not pay”.28  Perhaps most worrying 
however, was the growing problem of Palestinian nationalism, which threatened not only the security 
of Israel, but also of America’s moderate Jordanian client.  The solution was obvious; if the new 
administration was to revitalise Western hegemony in the Middle East – to stand up to the Soviets, 
contain the radicals and avert a regional crisis – then Nixon needed to implement a decisive strategy 
for the region immediately.  However, despite the urgent advice of the State Department, the new 
president did nothing to resolve the prevailing strategic need. 
 
When Richard Milhous Nixon became president in January 1969, the United States had been 
involved in the Vietnam conflict for fifteen years, at the expense of over thirty-six thousand American 
lives.29  During the 1968 election campaign, Nixon had promised a new strategy to “end the war and 
win the peace in the Pacific”.30  Although he did not explain how he intended to achieve this goal, his 
sentiment was received enthusiastically by voters.  Once in office, he committed himself to fulfilling his 
promise by micro-managing America’s campaign and personally authorising controversial new 
strategies, including the secret bombing of neighbouring Cambodia.  However, despite this concerted 
desire to release America from the burden of Vietnam, the administration was not willing to retreat 
from the conflict at the expense of American credibility.  In a world where the “perception of power had 
become as important as power itself”, it was not feasible for the US to simply pack up and abandon 
the country to Communism.31  As a result, the long retreat from Vietnam required as much, if not 
more, attention from the White House as had the US been committed to staying in the war indefinitely.   
 
In addition to the Vietnam distraction, the administration was also engaged in the time-
consuming task of Triangularisation.  By exploiting the much-publicised Sino-Soviet split to open 
relations with the People’s Republic of China, the White House hoped to create a multi-polar world 
system which would effectively turn the two leading Communist powers against each other.  This 
project promised to dramatically increase Washington’s political leverage in the Communist world, as 
well as enhancing American national security by dividing Soviet resources between multiple enemies.  
However, like the retreat from Vietnam, it demanded considerable attention from the administration. 
 
                                                 
28 Henry Kissinger (1969), ‘Attachment to Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President 
Nixon: The Modern World, A Single “Strategic Theatre”, September 29’, section B. III: 4. 
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30 Richard M Nixon (1968), cited in ‘Richard Nixon’, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Nixon#1968_Election 
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With such major ambitions in Southeast Asia, Nixon simply did not consider the issue of 
American Middle East strategy to be a foreign policy priority in 1969.  Certainly, the president made 
dramatic speeches on the importance of preserving Gulf oil and countering radicalism, but no strategy 
document emerged from this rhetoric; no serious effort was made to develop the vague policies 
inherited from Johnson into a coherent regional system.  In fact, despite the threats facing America’s 
position in the Middle East, Kissinger claims that Nixon expressly forbade him from advancing a 
strategy for the region.32  Ostensibly, this edict was inspired by concerns that the challenge of 
elaborating a Middle East strategy would have proven a distraction to Kissinger, thereby undermining 
progress on the administration’s ‘more important’ Southeast Asian objectives.  However, Nixon’s full 
motivation becomes apparent in light of his decision to delegate responsibility for the Middle East to 
his unlikely Secretary of State, William Rogers. 
 
Rogers was an unlikely choice for Secretary of State principally because he lacked any 
experience of foreign policy.  A lawyer by training, he had served in the Eisenhower administration as 
Attorney General alongside then Vice-President Nixon.  Truth be told, Rogers was not Nixon’s first 
choice; Ambassador Robert Murphy, a distinguished retired diplomat, had already declined the post 
when Nixon offered it to his old colleague.33  Nevertheless, Rogers’ inexperience did have a certain 
attraction.  Since the president possessed a strong mistrust of the Foreign Service, largely as a result 
of his inherent bitterness towards the moneyed East Coast families from which much of the American 
bureaucracy hailed, he wanted to appoint a Secretary of State whose primary loyalty would be to the 
White House, not the Foreign Service.  Nixon hoped that Rogers’ inexperience would leave the 
Secretary no option but to tow the White House line.  As it transpired however, Rogers was too easily 
swayed by his subordinates and so, rather than dominating the State Department as Nixon had 
hoped, he became a pawn of the bureaucracy.  Consequently, the Secretary found himself sidelined 
from policy-making, especially when it came to critical decisions or delicate negotiations.34  With the 
majority of foreign policy being run from the White House, Rogers’ remit was reduced to marginal 
arenas “where success seemed elusive [or]… where the risks of domestic reaction were high”.35   
 
From the very start of his presidency, Nixon was under considerable pressure to do something 
about the Middle East.  The delegation of responsibility to Secretary Rogers was his response to this 
pressure.  At face value, this gesture gave the impression of active engagement with the turbulent 
region.  However, bearing in mind Rogers’ political marginality, it becomes clear that Rogers’ 
commission was merely a diplomatic smokescreen.  Had the president genuinely intended to develop 
a coherent strategy for the Middle East, he would surely have put an experienced and respected 
official in charge of the project.  By delegating to Secretary Rogers, Nixon revealed that his primary 
                                                 
32 Henry Kissinger (1979), The White House Years, 348. 
33 Henry Kissinger (1979), The White House Years, 26. 
34 Henry Kissinger (1979), The White House Years, 28. 
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aim was not to encourage strategic clarity, but simply to create a façade of activity.  That being said, 
Nixon was by no means indifferent towards the issue of strategy in the Middle East.  An apathetic 
Nixon would have allowed the Secretary of State to pursue whatever limited policies his marginal 
influence could muster; progress towards a pro-Israel arrangement, a pro-Arab arrangement, or no 
progress at all would have been equally acceptable.  In reality, Nixon was constantly intervening to 
frustrate Secretary Rogers’ efforts, included his flagship project, the Rogers Plan.  Upon the 
announcement of this settlement proposal, which called for Israel to withdraw “to the old international 
frontier between Egypt and Palestine and from nearly all of the West Bank of Jordan”, as well as 
further concessions on Gaza, Jerusalem and Sharm el-Sheik, Nixon shared a private telephone 
conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to reassure her that the plan was exactly what its 
name implied – the private project of Secretary Rogers – and had nothing to do with the White 
House.36  These interventions reveal that, far from being disinterested in the problem of strategic 
clarity, Nixon was determined to resist developments that would dispel the cloud of ambiguity 
surrounding America’s relationship with the Middle East.   
 
In 1969, America’s most valuable asset in the Middle East was its promising relationship with 
Israel.  Therefore, while the State Department’s unashamedly Arab-friendly policies promised to 
improve regional stability by tempering Arab aggression, their negative repercussions for US-Israeli 
relations were considered unacceptable by the White House.  Pointedly however, while Nixon 
objected to Secretary Rogers’ efforts to advance a pro-Arab strategy, he was equally opposed to the 
emergence of an explicitly pro-Israel strategy; despite frequent affirmations of Israel’s importance to 
America as “the current most effective stopper to the Mideast power of the Soviet Union”, Nixon made 
no effort to commit Washington to a formal strategic partnership with Tel Aviv during the first year and 
a half of his administration.37  Exactly why is uncertain.  Perhaps the idea of a strategy that made 
American interests reliant upon Israel did not sit well with the president.  After all, Nixon’s previous 
experience of strategy-making had been in the Eisenhower administration – a White House more 
committed than most to the pursuit of US-Arab partnerships.  Whatever his concerns about a US-
Israeli partnership may have been, by preserving ambiguity in American Middle East strategy, Nixon 
was able to maintain the valuable working relationship with Israel, without being forced to commit to a 
formal partnership with Tel Aviv.  However, just as the State Department had warned, there was a 
serious price for choosing ill-defined ambiguity over strategic coherence.  Ultimately, whatever limited 
benefits ambiguity may have offered, the prevailing ad hoc arrangement was insufficient to counter the 
serious threats facing America in the Middle East. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF NIXON’S STRATEGIC NEGLECT 
During the course of Nixon’s first twenty-one months in office, America’s already serious 
problems in the Middle East grew inexorable worse.  By not advancing a clear strategy that would fill 
the regional power vacuum, Nixon failed to present a firm response to the Kremlin’s escalating 
opportunism, leaving Soviet penetration of the pivotal region to continue unopposed.  The full extent of 
this penetration was particularly evident in Egypt, where Nasser’s War of Attrition with Israel quickly 
facilitated the deployment of unprecedented levels of Soviet personnel on Arab soil.  Meanwhile, the 
continued deterioration of the region’s moderate enclaves demonstrated that vague bilateral 
arrangements alone were insufficient to combat the spread of aggressive Arab nationalism.38  This 
was especially true of Palestinian nationalism, which, through its ongoing conflict with Israel, 
threatened the very stability of the region.  Despite this danger, Nixon turned a blind eye to the conflict 
and, by failing to advance a strategy that could tackle the Palestinian problem at its root, allowed 
violence between the fedayeen and IDF to spiral. 
 
 
Appeasing the Soviet Union 
  The president was very clear on what he thought the Soviets were doing in the Middle East.  
As he told his Special Assistant, Pat Buchanan in February 1970: “They want control of the Middle 
East; they want the oil it contains; they want a land bridge to Africa”.39  However, despite this 
conviction and the visibly escalating threat, Nixon made no effort to counter Soviet opportunism by 
resolving America’s strategic ambiguity. 
 
In March, Moscow supplied Nasser with a massive shipment of Soviet arms, “including the 
most advanced Soviet antiaircraft system – the SA-3 surface-to-air missile.  This [weapons system] 
had never before been given to a foreign country, not even north Vietnam”.40  This alarming delivery 
(which was deliberately engineered to coincide with the start of an important ceasefire) not only 
threatened to escalate the conflict between Egypt and Israel, but was also taken as evidence of the 
ever closer bond between Cairo and the Kremlin.  Nixon however, paid little attention to the 
controversial shipment; his thoughts were fixed exclusively on Cambodia, where American forces were 
conducting a secret offensive against Communist guerrillas.  In fact, it took six months and a 
considerable political debacle before Nixon finally agreed to provide Tel Aviv with American Shrike 
missiles to compensate for Egypt’s Soviet-supplied SAM-3s and not once during that time did he 
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chastise Cairo for its part in escalating hostilities.41  Secretary Rogers on the other hand, did seek to 
respond to the mushrooming Soviet presence.  Rogers hoped that a conciliatory approach would 
foster a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt, which in turn would extinguish Cairo’s interest in 
Moscow.  However, as Bill Hyland, an NSC Soviet expert, advised at the time: 
The Soviets respect power and strength.  They understand military strength best of all…  But they do not 
understand restraint; it confuses them and in the end leads them to conclude that there is room for 
forward movement.42
Rather than undermining the Kremlin’s position therefore, Rogers’ hesitant appeasement served to 
convince Moscow that the US was willing to concede the Middle East to Soviet domination.43   
 
As the summer progressed and Washington’s position remained undefined, the Soviets took 
full advantage of America’s apparent abdication: by early July, Nasser’s arsenal of SAM-3 missiles 
had multiplied several times and there were in excess of ten thousand Soviet combat personnel 
stationed in Egypt, cementing Moscow’s foothold in the influential Arab state.44  With this foothold in 
place, foreign observers feared that the Kremlin was only a step away from establishing Soviet 
hegemony throughout the region.  Moreover, by deploying such massive numbers of combat 
personnel in Egypt, the Kremlin risked becoming directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, thereby 
transforming Nasser’s local war into a potential superpower confrontation. 
 
 
Ignoring the Plight of Palestine 
The situation on Israel’s eastern border was equally serious.  In his determination to prevent 
the emergence of a clear regional strategy, Nixon thwarted several attempts to advance a settlement 
on the Occupied Territories which might have soothed Palestinian anger towards Israel.45  As a 
consequence, fedayeen activity continued and indeed, intensified. 
 
                                                 
41 DOS (1970), ‘Deterring Possible Major Unilateral Violation of the Middle East Ceasefire by Israel, September 6’, DDRS (Gale 
Group: Farmington Mills), Document Number CK3100548307, section VI, subsection B1. 
42 Bill Hyland (1970), June 8, cited in Henry Kissinger (1979), The White House Years, 570. 
43 Rogers’ ill-advised appeasement is doubly frustrating in light of contemporary reports regarding the limitations of Soviet power 
in the Middle East.  As John Foster and Harold Saunders of the NSC noted in 1968, Soviet Middle East strategy revolved 
around “masquerades of power”, not actual power.  Another official, this time from Roger’s own department, observed that “the 
Soviet intention, often successful, has been to convince the Arabs that they would support them if the situation so required, 
without actually doing so”.  Had the Secretary of State had the wisdom to respond to Soviet advances with a show of American 
determination, the Soviet Union would have been revealed as no more than a “paper tiger” and Moscow’s grip on the region 
would have crumbled.  John Foster & Harold Saunders (1968), ‘The Middle East and North Africa, 1963-1968: A New Balance 
Emerging? June 4’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), Document Number: CK3100506967, 2; DOS (1969), 
‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section I, subsection 2, subsection 3b. 
44 Henry Kissinger (1979), The White House Years, 572. 
45 Henry Kissinger (1969), ‘Memorandum for the President: The Middle East – Some Policy Considerations, February 3’, DDRS 
(Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), Document Number: CK3100122913, section A2. 
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It should be noted that the physical power of the fedayeen did not pose a direct threat to the 
integrity of Israel; despite minor victories against IDF units, the guerrillas possessed nowhere near 
enough resources to challenge the sophisticated Israel military.46  That being said, the constant 
guerrilla activity did represent a problem for Tel Aviv.  Although the IDF had repeatedly proven its 
superiority in conflict with Arab forces, Israelis remained widely convinced of their own vulnerability 
and the ongoing threat of annihilation.  Guided by this misplaced sense of vulnerability, Israel 
responded to fedayeen insurgency with a zero tolerance policy characterised by violent reprisals 
against Palestinian refugee camps and those Arab states which supported and sheltered the 
insurgents.  Pointedly, these Israeli reprisals were often considerably more violent than the original 
attacks.  This disproportionality had two purposes.  Firstly, it sought to convince Israel’s enemies that 
supporting fedayeen terrorism was too costly a strategy to maintain.  Secondly, it sought to assuage 
domestic anger towards the insurgents.  As the State Department observed in 1969:  
To say that Israel has the political and military means to respond to Arab provocation without resort to 
massive retaliatory actions, however, misses the main point…  If the Government cannot prevent the 
Arabs from taking Israeli lives, it must… demonstrate dramatically that it can make the Arabs pay 
heavily.47
 
The obvious problem with the strategy of disproportionate retaliation was that, in seeking to 
quash the insurgency, Israel’s reprisals actually served to exacerbate the conflict; the more violently 
Israel responded to fedayeen activity, the more sympathetic the general Arab population became to 
the Palestinian cause.  Indeed, even the moderate Lebanese and Jordanians were growing weary of 
tolerating Israel’s high-handed aggression towards their populations.  In both countries, the combined 
pressure of internal unrest and Israeli reprisals threatened to topple the incumbent regimes in favour 
of more radical leaders – a development that would undoubtedly lead to further conflict and perhaps 
even a return to open warfare in the region. 
 
 
* * * * * * * 
 
Nixon’s failure to advance a coherent strategy for the Middle East during the first year and a 
half of his administration had not simply disabled the United States from engaging dynamically with 
the Arab bloc and its neighbours.  This development was itself a major problem for US-Middle East 
relations, but the true impact of strategic ambiguity was more serious still.  In fact, Nixon’s penchant 
for strategic ambiguity had directly contributed to a visible deterioration of America’s position in the 
turbulent yet strategically significant region.  Unopposed by the US, the Soviet Union established a 
comprehensive regional presence at America’s expense, Arab nationalism continued to menace the 
region’s remaining moderate regimes and Palestinian guerrillas – who simply wanted justice for their 
                                                 
46 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section I, subsection 1d. 
47 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section II, subsection 5. 
CHAPTER TWO: American Middle East Strategy Under Nixon, 1969-1970: 31 
Samuel E. Markey                                                            The US-Israeli Partnership & America’s Search 
for Strategy in the Middle East, 1945-1974 
people – threatened to ignite a new round of Arab-Israeli hostilities.  With crises of potentially global 
proportions brewing in the region, the United States could not afford to continue this ill-judged strategic 
ambiguity any longer, but what would it take to convince the president that a strategic re-evaluation 
was in order?  As it transpired, a catalyst for change lay just around the corner. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: American Middle East Strategy Under Nixon, 1969-1970: 32 
Samuel E. Markey                                                                                                                                                         The US-Israeli Partnership & America’s Search 
for Strategy in the Middle East, 1945-1974 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
STRATEGIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE JORDAN CRISIS 
 
 
CRISIS IN JORDAN 
During the summer of 1970, in accordance with the Rogers Plan, Jordan’s Hashemite regime 
tightened security along the long Israeli-Jordanian border, denying the fedayeen access to Israeli targets.1  
For anti-Hashemite radicals, this betrayal was the last straw.  On the first of September, the fragile truce 
between Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian regime was shattered by an assassination attempt 
against King Hussein.  Hussein survived the attempt, but his country was plunged into civil conflict as the 
full extent of Palestinian unrest was unleashed.  In the days that followed, further (unsuccessful) attempts 
were made on Hussein’s life and fighting broke out in the streets.  Guerrillas from the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four commercial aircraft, eventually exploding them in front of the 
assembled media and declaring Irbid, Jordan’s second largest city, a ‘liberated region’.2   
 
On the 16 September, the King responded by declaring martial law and, the following morning, 
unleashing his loyal Bedouin-led military on the Palestinian insurgency.  In America, President Nixon gave 
a “tough law-and-order speech” denouncing the guerrillas.3  While Jordanian tanks shelled the 
headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Amman, ground forces began a 
                                                 
1 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis: Correcting the Record’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, 
No. 1, Spring, 122. 
2 Anon (n.d.), ‘Jordanian Removal of the PLO’, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/jordan-civil.htm 
(accessed 16.02.07). 
3 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 123. 
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comprehensive purge of fedayeen facilities in Irbid, Salt, Sweileh and Zarqa.  Heavy urban warfare 
between the Jordanian army and uncoordinated fedayeen fighters resulted in massive Palestinian 
casualties, both guerrilla and civilian.  It seemed that Hussein had regained the upper hand and 
Washington applauded his decisive course of action.  However, there remained a risk that other Arab 
regimes might move to reinforce the ailing Palestinian insurgency.  Consequently, Nixon “discretely” 
informed newspapers that the US would intervene on behalf of their client if “Syria or Iraq were to join the 
fighting on the side of the Palestinians”.4  Despite these stern warnings, on the evening of the 18 
September, “small contingents of Syrian armoured divisions crossed into Jordan, followed [the next 
morning] by a massive Syrian invasion”.5  As some two hundred Syrian tanks rolled to the aid of the 
insurgents, King Hussein asked Washington to make good on its promise of intervention. 
 
Although the administration had largely neglected the Middle East prior to the Jordan crisis, Nixon 
was deeply concerned by the Syrian invasion.  In recent months, “Soviet diplomatic recalcitrance” and 
reports of a secret submarine base at Cienfuegos in Cuba had led the new administration to believe that it 
was being tested by the Kremlin.6  The invasion of Jordan by Moscow’s Syrian client was interpreted in 
light of this belief, as a further test of America’s mettle.  Suddenly the Middle East had become the centre 
of a “superpower psychodrama” and Nixon was “determined to signal to the Soviets that he would stand 
firm”.7  Despite warnings from Pentagon officials that America’s considerable commitments in Southeast 
Asia would severely limit the US capacity to intervene in Jordan, Nixon reaffirmed his commitment to 
Hussein’s survival by placing the Sixth Fleet on a war footing.8   
 
Crucially however, the administration’s failure to establish a coherent strategy and prevailing 
position in the region prior to 1970 meant that Nixon’s subsequent options were extremely limited.  Thanks 
to Nixon’s preference for maintaining strategic ambiguity in America’s dealings with the Middle East, 
Washington possessed no allies of consequence in the immediate vicinity of Jordan.  Meanwhile, 
America’s European allies were proving exceptionally uncooperative.  Even the mighty Sixth Fleet was of 
limited use thanks to the presence of its new Soviet counterpart.9  There was, of course, an option for the 
United States to intervene unilaterally in Jordan, but this clearly would have been a dangerous move; US 
                                                 
4 William B. Quandt (1971), ‘The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 47; Peter 
Lisagor (1970), Chicago Sun-Times, 17 September, cited in Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 
123. 
5 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 124. 
6 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 121, 124. 
7 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 118, 121. 
8 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 123. 
9 Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jnr. (1972), ‘View from the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship’, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 92, 
February, 27. 
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Marines and air power could certainly make the Syrians reconsider their invasion, but such an enterprise 
would undoubtedly draw the Soviets into the fray.  With Soviet MiGs stationed in Egypt and 
reinforcements only a short distance away, American forces would be totally inadequate.  Having put his 
nation’s prestige on the line, Nixon needed to follow through on his rhetoric, but without a coherent 
strategy, it was unclear how he could do so.  As Adam Garfinkle comments, “It was at this point that a 
standing Israeli offer to coordinate policy attracted serious consideration”.10
 
Israel was initially asked to provide local intelligence on the crisis, which Washington could relay 
to Hussein.  The Israelis however, were keen to take a more active role.  What if, Rabin asked Kissinger, 
the intelligence warranted an airstrike?  Was Israel authorised to implement such a response, or were they 
“simply playing postman”?11  On the 20 September, having discussed the matter with Nixon, Kissinger 
informed Rabin that America would “look favourably upon an Israeli air attack”.12  Rabin, further pressing 
the matter, asked if the same authorisation applied to Israeli ground forces and if so, would the US protect 
Israel in the event of an Egyptian counterattack?  Apparently, Nixon agreed to endorse Israeli ground 
strikes without consulting the National Security Council (NSC) or Washington Special Advisory Group 
(WSAG), but Kissinger delayed informing Tel Aviv of Nixon’s decision and later convinced the president to 
reconsider the matter with the aid of the WSAG.13  Popular mythology suggests that Nixon remained 
committed to an Israeli ground assault during these discussions, even agreeing to provide a nuclear 
umbrella in the case of Soviet intervention, but this was not the case.  As Garfinkle astutely comments: 
Not more than fifteen hours elapsed between the supposed US decision to work out a joint contingency plan 
with Israel and the plan’s supposed approval.  Working out all the details of a joint plan to mutual satisfaction 
in such a short time, especially if it included an American umbrella against the Soviets, would have been 
quite a feat.14
The truth was that America was highly reticent to become entangled in a Middle East conflict – whether by 
committing to defend either the Jordanians or the Israelis – especially if it would mean a direct 
confrontation with the Soviet Union.  Consequently, Washington procrastinated in its response to Tel Aviv, 
providing the Israelis with the same “constant but vague assurances it gave to Hussein”.15  While Israel 
was still waiting for Washington’s response, Hussein once again took matters into his own hands and, on 
the 22 September, repulsed the Syrians.  Five days later, Hussein and Arafat met with other Arab leaders 
in Cairo to agree a settlement.  The day after that, 28 September 1970, Gamal Abdul Nasser suffered a 
sudden heart attack and died. 
                                                 
10 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 126. 
11 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 127. 
12 Henry Kissinger (1979), White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.), 623. 
13 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 127. 
14 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 130. 
15 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 130-1. 
CHAPTER THREE: Strategic Repercussions of the Jordan Crisis: 35   
Samuel E. Markey                                                                                                                                                         The US-Israeli Partnership & America’s Search 
for Strategy in the Middle East, 1945-1974 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CRISIS 
After a year and a half spent ignoring the warnings of the State Department, the dramatic events 
of September 1970 finally convinced Nixon that the United States needed to define a clear and coherent 
strategy for the Middle East if it was to preserve its position in the region.  However, the crisis did more 
than simply catalyse an American strategic revision; as well as opening Nixon’s eyes to the dangers of an 
ambiguous strategic posture, the events of the Jordan crisis – especially its swift resolution – were 
influential in shaping the character of the administration’s new strategy.  As the dust from the retreating 
Syrian tanks was still settling, the president’s imprudent and ambiguous response to the Palestinian 
uprising was reinterpreted as a “determined, forceful… posture” which had contributed directly to the swift 
restoration of stability.16  While the Pentagon breathed a sign of relief at the evasion of a catastrophic 
confrontation with Moscow, those indecisive officials who had bluffed America to the brink congratulated 
themselves on a job well done.  Thanks to their actions,  
The United States had [supposedly]… faced down the Russians and had shown that the US pre-occupation 
in Southeast Asia did not paralyze US policy elsewhere.  Hussein’s throne had been saved, the ‘terrorists’ 
defanged, the Syrians bloodied, and the Iraqis embarrassed by their own passivity.  The Chinese – with 
whom the administration was trying to establish relations – were shown that the United States was an ally 
worth having.17
However, America could not have achieved these victories alone: Israel was also believed to have played 
a pivotal role in resolving the crisis, leading Nixon to reserve a special place for Tel Aviv within his 
administration’s newly-defined strategy for the Middle East. 
 
 
Decline of the Arabist camp 
Traditionally, American administrations had accepted the theory that Arabs represented the 
predominant power group in the Middle East.  This theory, propagated by a variety of academics, oil men 
and military experts who may collectively be referred to as the Arabist camp, was based not only on Arab 
control of oil resources but also the Arabs’ considerable demographic advantage compared to other 
Middle Eastern groups.  Guided by this theory, Washington had spent decades pursuing Arab allies, even 
in the face of radical nationalism and Arab-Soviet liaisons.  Although the influence of the Arabist camp 
was gradually weakened by America’s frustration with the Arab bloc and, after 1967, Johnson’s decision 
to pursue a strategic arrangement with the region’s ‘next best’ power, the ongoing belief in Arab 
predominance had continued to limit America’s progress towards a US-Israeli partnership.  However, 
                                                 
16 William B. Quandt (1971), ‘The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71’, 48. 
17 Adam M. Garfinkle (1985), ‘US Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis’, 135. 
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Israel’s performance during the Syro-Palestinian uprising fundamentally challenged the Arabists’ 
argument.  Having received permission for aerial operations from Washington, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) 
had staged flyovers to intimidate Syrian divisions in Jordan.  In light of the subsequent Syrian retreat, 
American policy-makers swiftly attributed the cessation of hostilities to these demonstrations of Israeli 
power.  The IAF had never fired a shot, but it was believed that the mere threat of an Israeli intervention 
(which could be expected to result in yet another humiliating Arab defeat) had caused the insurgents to 
reconsider their revolution.  According to this remarkable interpretation of events, the traditional concept of 
Arab regional predominance was incorrect; despite their relative minority, the Israelis had seemingly 
intimidated the Arabs into submission, thereby demonstrating that Tel Aviv, rather than Cairo, Damascus 
or Baghdad, was the real seat of predominant power in the Middle East. 
 
Pointedly, the second strut of Arabist theory – the belief in a potential Arab-Soviet axis – was also 
discredited during the Jordan crisis.  Motivated by their belief in the strategic imperative to establish US-
Arab partnerships, Arabists were alarmed by Washington’s increasingly pro-Israeli posture from 1967.  
Fearing that the Kremlin would take advantage of the deteriorating relationship between America and the 
Arab bloc, Arabists warned Washington to revive US-Arab relations or face losing its “remaining bases of 
influence in the Eastern Arab world” to the Soviet Union.18  To counter the threat of Soviet ambition, 
Arabists even recommended building partnerships with the powerful Arab nationalist regimes: 
Distasteful as the nationalists are, they will be a major factor in shaping the future of the Near East. Tying 
ourselves just to our current Arab friends, an alignment resting inter alia on the remaining Arab monarchies 
of a fast-changing area looks like a risky bet.19
By partnering with Nasserite regimes, Arabists hoped that the US could harness radical nationalism, 
turning the movement which had been eroding America’s regional influence since the mid-1950s against 
the Soviets.  Naturally, this would mark a controversial departure form America’s prevailing strategy, but 
as one NSC survey observed: “We have little stake in what systems emerge – provided they are genuinely 
independent and pursue legitimate interests by peaceful means.  Strong nationalism is the main block to 
Communist expansion”.20  Although few policy-makers bought into the idea of exploiting nationalism to 
America’s advantage (it was simply too unpredictable to be harnessed constructively), the possibility of 
fostering a Soviet dominated Arab bloc was cause for concern and a major obstacle to US-Israeli 
partnership prior to the autumn of 1970.21
                                                 
18 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), 
Document Number: CK3100545667, subsection 5(1). 
19 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, subsection 4(b), subsection 1A, subsection 5(1). 
20 John Foster & Harold Saunders (1968), ‘The Middle East and North Africa, 1963-1968: A New Balance Emerging? June 4’, DDRS 
(Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), Document Number: CK3100506967, 1. 
21 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), 
Document Number: CK3100552758, section I, subsection 1e. 
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Of course, Arabists were correct in believing that the Soviet Union hoped to dominate the Middle 
East through the Arab bloc; the Kremlin had been seeking to establish a stronghold in the region since the 
1940s.  Early efforts in Syria were frustrated by political instability (thanks in part to covert CIA operations 
under Eisenhower), forcing Moscow to settle for piecemeal influence in Damascus.  During the early 
1960s, the Kremlin targeted Iraq, but soon found Baghdad to be equally uncooperative.  On this occasion, 
it was not political instability that frustrated the Kremlin’s designs, but political dynamism in the shape of 
indigenous nationalist movements like the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party which forced the Communists out of 
power in 1968.  By the late 1960s, Moscow’s attention had turned to Egypt.  Under Nasser’s leadership, 
Cairo had become the driving seat of the Arab world and a worthy candidate for Soviet partnership.  
Indeed, by the summer of 1970, Soviet forces were well-established in Egypt and Arabist fears of an Arab-
Soviet stronghold looked close to becoming a reality.   
 
However, Nasser’s sudden demise that autumn revealed another reality.  The intense War of 
Attrition had left Egypt economically dessicated and politically unstable.  With the charistmatic figurehead 
of Arab nationalism gone and Cairo severely weakened, the portended Soviet-Egyptian axis now seemed 
highly unlikely.  In light of this analysis, Arabist-inspired efforts to secure Arab states against Communist 
domination  seemed largely redundant; without a Soviet stronghold in Egypt, native anti-imperialism would 
likely provide a sufficient limiting effect on Moscow’s ambitions.  Indeed, by retiring from the competition 
over the Arab World, Washington could effectively saddle Moscow “with support of the turbulent Arab 
states who [faced] generations of evolution and modernization before they [could] serve as dependable 
bases for power”.22  In other words, while the Soviets wasted resources trying to transform the unruly 
Arabs into useful clients, the West would be free to concentrate its attentions on more productive 
enterprises elsewhere.   
 
With the two principle Arabists arguments seemingly discredited by the events of September, the 
influence of the Arabist camp in American policy-making withered rapidly.  This political power vacuum 
created an unprecedented opportunity for both America’s pro-Israel lobby and the Israeli government to 
increase their respective influence in Washington’s corridors of power.  It is no surprise therefore that, 
following the Jordan crisis, Nixon’s new approach to the Middle East was centred upon a formalised US-
Israeli partnership. 
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The US-Israeli Strategic Partnership 
The Israelis and their American sympathisers had long sought to establish a strategic 
arrangement between Washington and Tel Aviv.  As early as 1957, Ben Gurion appealed to Washington 
for “American military hardware, a formal US guarantee of Israeli security, and Washington’s agreement 
‘that the NATO commitment [i.e. a nuclear umbrella] should be extended to the Middle East’”.23  However, 
it was not until the end of the 1960s that such a relationship became a genuine possibility. 
 
In July 1969, at a conference in Guam, President Nixon unveiled a new strategy rather 
inaccurately recorded in history as the Nixon Doctrine.24  This ‘doctrine’, the result of decades of American 
military over-extension, centred on the following principle: 
The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends… but America cannot 
– and will not – conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all 
the defense of the free nations of the world.  We will help where it makes a difference and is considered in 
our interest.25
In keeping with this principle, America sought to identify strong local partners who could assume 
responsibility for maintaining regional security on behalf of the US in exchange for closer relations and 
comprehensive arms deals.  Initially, this meant the South Vietnamese, to whom Nixon intended to 
transfer the burden of the continued Vietnam War, but the process of ‘Vietnamisation’ was not limited to 
Southeast Asia.  Seeing this as an opportunity to obtain a security guarantee from the US and advance 
Israel’s international status at the expense of the Arab bloc, Tel Aviv worked hard to present itself to 
Washington as the very “embodiment of the Nixon Doctrine”.26   
 
The primary requirement for a Regional Guardian was the possession of a strong, self-sufficient 
military, capable of exerting influence over a regional sphere.  Israel had already demonstrated that it 
possessed considerable military prowess through its ongoing conflict with the Arab bloc.  Indeed, in 1969 
the State Department noted that “the Israeli military [were] confident of their ability to defeat any 
                                                 
23 State Department memcon, ‘Israel’s Need for a Security Guarantee’, 31 October 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 17, 779-85; Douglas Little 
(1993), ‘The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-69’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
25, 565. 
24 The term was inaccurate since, as a pedantic Zbigniew Brzezinski noted at the time, it referred to the beginning of a “process of 
redefinition of American foreign policy”, rather than the fully-realised culmination of such a process, as the Truman Doctrine had 
been.  Moreover, it was not Nixon’s own creation, but the work of Melvin Laird, then Secretary of Defence.  Zbigniew Brzezinski 
(1971), ‘Half Past Nixon’, Foreign Policy, No. 3 (Summer), 20-1; A. James Reichley (1981), Conservatives in an Age of Change: The 
Nixon and Ford Administrations (The Brooklings Institute: Washington DC), 110. 
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Richard Nixon: 1969 (Government Printing Office: Washington DC), 544-48. 
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combination of Arab states”.27  When Nixon came to power, any number of analysts would have agreed 
that the IDF had more than proved its ability to vanquish any Arab force it faced in battle, but if Israel 
hoped to be granted a strategic partnership with the US, Tel Aviv had to demonstrate that its military 
power extended to maintaining regional stability, as well as offensive-defensive operations.  Tel Aviv’s 
commitment to the ruthless strategy of Deterrent Force – a doctrine that demanded that Israel not only 
possess an “overwhelming military superiority” vis-à-vis its Arab neighbours, but also “the determination to 
strike first” when necessary – had certainly cultivated the potential for the IDF to impose a stabilising effect 
on the Middle East; with memories of the Six Day War still fresh in Arab minds, the certain knowledge that 
Israel would pre-empt any further acts of aggression with overwhelming force must have fostered caution 
amongst even the most radical circles.  US officials, who were painfully aware of America’s own failings in 
Vietnam, applauded Israel’s apparent success in frustrating Arab nationalist ambitions (and by implication, 
Communist subversion).28  However, measuring the direct influence of Deterrent Force on regional 
stability was problematic.  How could the US be sure that Israel’s military strategy was responsible for 
containing destabilising elements when skirmishing and violence was a daily occurrence in the Middle 
East?  Arguably, large-scale attacks had been deterred by the threat of an Israeli counterattack, but there 
was no way to know this for a fact.  Lacking tangible evidence, the IDF’s capacity to impose regional 
stability remained unproven until September 1970. 
 
According to the White House interpretation of events, Israel’s contribution to the suppression of 
the Syro-Palestinian uprising in Jordan provided clear evidence that Israel did indeed possess the ability 
to exercise a stabilising influence over the Arab bloc.  Nixon himself took the swift resolution of the crisis 
as “evidence that the Nixon Doctrine worked” and Tel Aviv was immediately rewarded with a full strategic 
partnership.29  To accompany this promotion, America moved to further increase Israel’s already 
significant allocation of aid.  Military aid soared from $140 million in 1968-70 to an incredible $1.15 billion 
in 1971-73.30  The increase in total US aid to Israel from the 1960s to the 1970s was nearly two thousand 
percent.31  Congress had already passed a bill authorising the supply of armaments to Israel sufficient to 
                                                 
27 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section II, subsection 1c. 
28 Barry Rubin (1973), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 100; For their part, the Pentagon celebrated the fact that US weapons 
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(February), 380-381. 
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31 1960-69: $834.8 million, 1970-79: $16,309.2 million.  Martha Wenger (1990), ‘US Aid to Israel: From Handshake to Embrace’, 14. 
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offset “past, present and future Soviet deliveries to Arab states”.32  Legislation passed subsequent to the 
Jordan crisis, including the Master Defense Development Data Exchange Agreement of December 1970, 
widened this provision still further, granting the administration “absolute authority to supply Israel [with…] 
‘virtually any conventional American arms Israelis might desire’”, including “armoured vehicles, air-to-air 
and air-to-surface weapons, electronic warfare and surveillance systems“.33  Equipped with these 
sophisticated arms, Israel was truly fit to take its place as America’s proxy in the Middle East. 
 
 
A System of Sentinels and Spheres 
Nixon’s move towards a formal partnership with Tel Aviv placed Israel at the core of a new supra-
regional system intended to establish American hegemony throughout the Mediterranean, Middle East 
and Indian Ocean.  Unlike previous pacts, this new system was not guided by a strategy of 
comprehensive defence in depth.  Outside of the core European battleground, the traditional defence in 
depth model had achieved little success, as local developments like nationalism – buoyed either by the 
Soviets or the Non-Aligned Movement – repeatedly frustrated Washington’s efforts to construct a unified 
front against Communist subversion.  The Nixon system was a response to these failings, drawing lessons 
from the model which had preserved Britain’s global predominance for over two hundred years, to 
advance an approach founded not upon a general colonisation of power, but upon sentinels and spheres 
of influence.  This new approach allowed the United States to refrain from chasing friendly relations with 
every country in a given region and concentrate instead on building partnerships with states of strategic 
value.  Once these states were empowered with American arms and diplomatic authority, they became 
sentinels of American hegemony, radiating spheres of influence which served to draw the region’s 
remaining states – friends and rebels alike – into the American system. 
 
Seven sentinels were selected for Nixon’s new strategic alliance.  Pointedly, neither France nor 
Italy made the list, chiefly because of Washington’s anxiety over leftist tendencies in both countries.  
Indeed, during his first European tour in 1969, Nixon made no more than a formal visit to Rome and 
actually “skipped France altogether”.34  Great Britain was also excluded from the new alliance, although 
given London’s economic insecurity this is hardly surprising.  Nixon’s seven sentinels were Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and, of course, Israel.  The strategic value of these states is obvious: the 
Iberian sentinels controlled access to and activity within the western Mediterranean, while Greece played 
a similar role in the central Mediterranean region.  Turkey – who, despite increasing independence during 
                                                 
32 Eqbal Ahmad (1971), ‘Israel and USA: Towards a New Pact’, Pakistan Forum, December-January, 8. 
33 Eqbal Ahmad (1971), ‘Israel and USA: Towards a New Pact’, 8; Shelia Ryan (1987), ‘US Military Contracts in Israel’, Middle East 
Report, January-February, 17. 
34 Eqbal Ahmad (1971), ‘Israel and USA: Towards a New Pact’, 7. 
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the 1960s, had remained loyal to the US due to a “mutual opposition to Soviet expansion” – continued to 
provide an essential frontline defence against the Soviet Union, as well as a pro-American influence over 
the eastern Mediterranean.35  Further east, the Shah of Iran – another well-established American ally – 
maintained US interests in the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf.  Combined with the ever-present Sixth 
Fleet and the newly-expanded US Middle East Force (based in Bahrain), these states formed a network of 
interlocking spheres capable of exerting American hegemony from the Azores to Bangladesh.36  At the 
heart of the system – custodian of the vacuum formerly occupied by Imperial Britain – sat Israel, sentinel 
for the Middle East and “chief constable” of America’s new regional police force.37
 
* * * * * * * 
 
By late 1970, America’s approach to the Middle East had undergone a radical transformation.  
After years of strategic ambiguity, the reality of Soviet-sponsored Syrian tanks in friendly Jordan had 
finally convinced the White House that a more decisive regional approach was required.  The character of 
this new approach was defined by the administration’s own peculiar interpretation of the crisis.  According 
to the White House, the suppression of the Syro-Palestinian uprising by Israeli air power had discredited 
the legitimacy of lingering Arabist inclinations in American policy-making, paving the way for a new 
regional conception centred on Israeli predominance.  Catalysed by this paradigm shift, the United States 
abandoned efforts to restore working relations with the Arab bloc and looked instead towards a formalised 
arrangement with Tel Aviv.  However, while the transition from ambiguity to clarity was an undeniably 
radical development in America’s dealings with the Middle East, the advent of a formal US-Israeli 
partnership in the autumn of 1970 should not be mistaken for the emergence of a coherent American 
strategy for the region.   
 
The guiding principle behind the US-Israeli alliance was pragmatism.  A prolonged policy of 
strategic ambiguity had left Washington ill-prepared and ill-equipped to respond to major developments in 
the Middle East and consequently, when civil war broke out in Jordan, the White House was plunged into 
strategic crisis.  The establishment of a formal partnership with Tel Aviv in the aftermath of the Palestinian 
uprising was a direct response to this strategic crisis.  With the American Middle East system in rapid 
decay, Washington needed to identify ways to revitalise its regional influence.  Israel, now understood to 
                                                 
35 John Foster & Harold Saunders (1968), ‘The Middle East and North Africa, 1963-1968: A New Balance Emerging? June 4’, 9. 
36 In 1972, the newly-independent government of Bahrain granted the US Navy base rights, formalising an unofficial agreement that 
had existed since 1948.  This facility – the only foreign military base in the Gulf – was home to MIDEASTFOR, a fleet that 
manoeuvred “from East Africa to Bangladesh”.  Buzz Theberge (1972), ‘US Base in Bahrain: Guarding the Gulf’, MERIP Reports, 
No. 8 (March-April), 15. 
37 Eqbal Ahmad (1971), ‘Israel and USA: Towards a New Pact’, 8. 
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be the predominant power amongst the core states of the Middle East, was an ideal ally for an 
administration which operated on the neo-Machiavellian axiom that “peace is based on strength”.38  In 
concert with the nearby Turkish and Iranian sentinels, the US-Israeli alliance fortified the ailing American 
system, swiftly creating the impression of US hegemony within the contested region. 
 
Despite appearances however, Nixon’s new approach was totally ill-equipped to respond to the 
myriad destabilising influences present within the Middle East; regardless of IDF strength, a strategy that 
relied upon the non-Arab (indeed, non-Middle Eastern) states of Israel, Turkey and Iran could never hope 
to resolve the intrinsically Arab issues which faced the fragile region: How exactly could Tel Aviv counter 
the spread of radical Arab movements, when history had shown that Israel’s very existence was a prime 
catalyst for militant nationalism and Arab-Soviet partnership?39  How could Israel be expected to put an 
end to fedayeen terrorism, when its government was unwilling to recognise fundamental Arab grievances 
and its armed forces were perpetuating the spiral of aggression?  How would America’s remaining Arab 
allies respond to Washington’s support for the expansionist Israeli and Persian regimes?  In short, Nixon 
had not established a coherent regional strategy, but simply a modified version of the Northern Tier; after 
decades of upheaval, US Middle East strategy had simply retreated to its default setting. 
                                                 
38 Richard Nixon, cited in Eqbal Ahmad (1971), ‘Israel and USA: Towards a New Pact’, 8. 
39 Indeed, Tariq Ali observes: “If the Zionist state had not existed it is likely that Arab nationalism would have disappeared with the 
withdrawal of Britain and France from the region”.  Tariq Ali (2003), The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity 
(Verso: London & NY), 113. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE US-ISRAELI STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 1970 - 1973 
 
 
Inevitably, America’s transition from strategic ambiguity to a firmly pro-Israel posture had 
significant consequences for the geo-politics of the Middle East.  For a start, Washington’s new 
approach put significant strain on US-Arab relations.  Not surprisingly, Arab leaders were deeply 
frustrated by Nixon’s contempt for traditional Arab pivots and formal alignment with Israel.  This 
frustration was further aggravated by another consequence of the US-Israeli partnership: Nixon’s 
controversial decision to withdraw Washington’s long-standing support for the Arab-Israeli peace 
process.   
 
The United States had been actively committed to establishing territorial justice in the Middle 
East since the Israeli War of Independence in 1948.  Even following the Six Day War, with American 
interest in the development of a US-Arab arrangement waning, the White House had remained at least 
theoretically committed to achieving a settlement.  However, by the autumn of 1970, the Arab-friendly 
idealism of the peace process had been deemed incompatible with Nixon’s pragmatic, Israel-centred 
policy.  As a consequence, the White House elected to quietly stall progress towards a settlement until 
such a time as the incompatibility between security and justice could be resolved. 
 
With the White House visibly committed to stalling the peace process, Arab frustration 
intensified.  State Department analysts feared that these tensions would polarise the region and lead 
to further instability, as disenchanted Arab states sought to resolve their unanswered complaints by 
violent means.  Even America’s moderate clients were believed vulnerable to such polarisation, either 
through a radicalisation of the prevailing establishment – disillusioned by the experience of courting an 
American administration committed to protecting Israeli interests over Arab grievances – or a 
usurpation of power by opportunistic elements, as almost took place in Jordan in 1970.  Critics warned 
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that the longer Washington relied upon its blunt, Israel-centric approach and ignored Arab grievances, 
the more polarised and unstable the region would become; a development that would place American 
interests, not least the flow of oil, in jeopardy. 
 
The White House, on the other hand, was far less concerned by the risk of polarisation in the 
Middle East.  Guided by its belief in the impotence of Arab regimes and the eternal lure of American 
patronage, White House staff dismissed State Department warnings, arguing that even if radical 
regimes were frustrated by recent developments, they posed no threat to regional stability.  
Meanwhile, they argued, America’s interests would remain secure, since the moderate and oil-
producing Arab regimes would necessarily remain loyal to the United States “in the interests of their 
own survival”.  As an earlier survey of regional projections put it, “The economic interest of the Arab 
governments in the flow of oil is so strong that, despite temptation to act irrationally, they are unlikely 
to cut it off for an extended period”.1   
 
In fact, the Nixon administration had significantly underestimated the vigour of Arab 
resentment towards the US, Israel and the non-existent peace process.  However, blinded by its 
mistaken assumptions, the White House saw no reason to modify its regional approach.  As it 
transpired, Washington continued in this false sense of security right up until October 1973, when 
Arab forces revealed the flaws in the prevailing paradigm by uniting to launch a devastating attack 
against an unsuspecting Israel. 
 
 
STALLING THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS 
The formation of the US-Israeli strategic partnership in the autumn of 1970 was accompanied 
by a flurry of diplomatic activity intended to convince the Arab bloc that Washington was still eager to 
achieve a settlement regarding the Israeli occupied territories.  One key element of this campaign was 
the State Department’s proposal in the winter of 1970 to reopen the Suez Canal.  State Department 
officials argued that an agreement on the canal would be the first step towards more comprehensive 
settlement negotiations.  Since the canal’s closure was depriving Cairo of “some $250 million in 
revenue a year”, as well as its symbolic status as “custodian of the world's busiest international 
waterway”, its proposed reopening was welcomed with interest by Nasser’s successor, Muhammad 
Anwar al-Sadat.2  However, Sadat was anxious that an agreement on the canal would lead to a 
fossilisation of the status quo, rather than further Israeli concessions.  In February 1971, to 
demonstrate his desire to achieve a meaningful settlement, Sadat announced a one-month extension 
to the Suez cease-fire and dispatched an official note to UN Ambassador Jarring in which he “publicly 
                                                 
1 DOS (1969), ‘Staff Study: US Interests in the Middle East, January 24’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), 
Document Number: CK3100545667, subsection 5(2), subsection 1B. 
2 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), 
Document Number: CK3100552758, section II, subsection 3. 
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acknowledged… his willingness to make peace with Israel”.3  Washington responded to these 
overtures with an official visit from Michael Sterner, head of the Egyptian Desk in the State 
Department, followed by a similar delegation to Tel Aviv.  Despite this flurry of activity however, it was 
increasingly clear that Sadat’s anxieties were correct; the United States had no intention of pressing 
Tel Aviv into meaningful territorial concessions.  The canal proposal, along with other elements of the 
administration’s diplomatic campaign, was simply propaganda designed “to give the Arabs the 
impression that [America] might yet intervene in their favour while in fact doing nothing but making 
time, allowing the Israelis to further consolidate their position”.4  In the summer of 1971, determined 
not to be “tricked into a partial settlement which would never lead to further Israeli withdrawal”, Sadat 
rejected the canal plan and began seeking alternative solutions to Arab grievances.5
 
 
A Strategic Decision 
The Nixon administration’s decision to stall progress towards a territorial settlement in the 
Middle East was a strategic resolution and a direct consequence of Nixon’s sentinel strategy.  The 
principle argument was that a settlement would cause injury to America’s new strategic partner without 
bringing any significant advantage in exchange.  In other words, since the White House no longer 
considered the Arabs to be a threat that required placating or potentially useful allies in need of 
seduction, there was no reward to be gained from satisfying Arab grievances beyond mere moral 
gratification.  On the other hand, were Israel to surrender the Occupied Territories to Arab control, Tel 
Aviv would be deprived of the strategic benefits afforded by Sinai, the Golan and West Bank.  These 
benefits were considerable.  As the former BBC Middle East Correspondent, Jeremy Bowen, notes in 
his book on the Six Day War, retreat from the these strategic territories threatened to reduce Israel’s 
defensibility dramatically: 
Withdrawal from the West Bank would not only multiply several times the border Israel has to defend, but 
would again leave Israel with the ‘wasp's waist’ that, prior to the June war, was always regarded by 
Israeli military leaders as Israel's most serious strategic weakness.  Israel is only 15 miles wide at this 
point, and on June 5, 1967 rounds fired from Jordanian guns hit the suburbs of Tel Aviv.  If Arab military 
forces were allowed back into the West Bank, Israel would be presented with the threat of a sudden and 
massive Arab military drive to pinch off the ‘waist’, dividing Israel in two.6
Elsewhere, a retreat from the Golan Heights would once again render Israeli settlements in the upper 
Jordan valley vulnerable to Syrian artillery, while a withdrawal from Sinai would mean that Israel’s 
“front lines would be 150 miles closer to home and considerably longer”.  The surrender of Sinai would 
also deprive Israel of the peninsula’s “advance air bases and early warning radar”, both of which had 
                                                 
3 William B. Quandt (1971), ‘The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.1, No. 1, 50. 
4 Michael Hudson (1973), ‘The US and the Middle East in the Second Nixon Administration’, American Committee for Justice in 
the Middle East (Boulder, Colorado), 2, cited in Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 102. 
5 William B. Quandt (1971), ‘The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71’, 49, 51. 
6 Jeremy Bowen (2003), Six Days: How the 1967 war shaped the Middle East (Simon & Schuster UK Ltd: London), 11. 
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made the IDF better prepared than ever to defend against surprise attacks, and deny Israeli the 
strategic advantages of controlling “the best tank trap ever made”, the Suez Canal.7  As Nixon’s 
sentinel approach relied upon Israel’s strength to maintain stability in the Middle East, the idea of 
reducing Israeli security in this way was unthinkable. 
 
Pointedly, even if the US had been in favour of a restoration of the Occupied Territories, 
convincing Israel to accept a settlement would have been another matter altogether.  To achieve a 
meaningful settlement would have undoubtedly required the US to impose prolonged and severe 
pressures on its new partner, most likely the suspension of economic and military aid.  This embargo 
might well have forced Israel to cooperate with settlement negotiations, but would have also had a 
detrimental effect on Tel Aviv’s defensive capacity, leaving Israel vulnerable to an opportunistic Arab 
attack.  In light of this possibility and Washington’s commitment to Israel’s survival, such a reduction of 
Israel’s security was deemed counterproductive: 
Assuming that the US would in the end intervene itself if Israel's survival were at stake, with all the risk of 
Big Power confrontation which this would imply, it would be contrary to US national interests for us to 
contribute to a significant weakening of Israel's defensive capabilities.8
In short, the aspiration to achieve territorial justice in the Middle East was considered of secondary 
importance to the maintenance of Israeli strength and security.  As a result of this practical reality, the 
Nixon White House suspended efforts to advance the peace process and settled for managed 
instability. 
 
 
“Officially Inspired Optimism”9
Exactly which domestic officials were privy to the administration’s opposition to a settlement in 
unclear.  Secretary Rogers’ vocal optimism regarding the peace process may well suggest that the 
State Department (or at least its chief) was not aware of the official policy.  It would certainly seem in 
keeping with the marginal nature of Nixon’s other dealings with Rogers to suggest that the neglected 
Secretary of State was not informed, at least not in full.  Moreover, given the secretary’s marginality, it 
seems more plausible that his frequent statements regarding ‘a genuine negotiating process’ were the 
naïve sentiments of an ill-informed and unusually sidelined statesman, rather than the conscious 
deceptions of a co-conspirator.  On the other hand, Rogers’ deputy, Joseph J. Sisco, does seem to 
have been aware of the anti-settlement policy.  In May 1973, the Assistant Secretary of State “publicly 
called for Israel to ‘prime the pump’ of negotiations with new ideas”.10  However, behind closed doors, 
                                                 
7 In addition to geographical advantages afforded by Sinai, the Israelis were also exploiting Egyptian-built oil platforms in the 
peninsula at a rate of 100,000 barrels a day.  DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section 
II, subsection 3. 
8 DOS (1969), ‘Report: International Situation in the Middle East, January 1’, section II, subsection 6. 
9 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 105. 
10 Barry Rubin (1973), ‘US Policy and the October War’, MERIP Reports, No. 23 (December), 7. 
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Sisco informed Israel’s “Washington ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, that this statement was only to keep 
the Arabs ‘off the US’s back’”.11
 
Whether deliberately misleading or simply misinformed, optimistic public statements regarding 
the peace process were undeniably useful to the administration.  Although the White House had 
privately decided against pursuing a settlement, there were various reasons why it was necessary for 
the US to maintain an illusion of interest in the project.  Such an illusion placated America’s colleagues 
in the United Nations who, having passed Resolution 242 in November 1967, wanted to see Israel 
return the Occupied Territories to Arab control as soon as possible.  Such an illusion also guaranteed 
that the Arab bloc continued to see the US as a source of hope, rather than a target for hatred.  As 
William B. Quandt observes, “it is only when the Arab governments, and in particular Egypt, are 
convinced that the United States has nothing to offer them, that they will begin to attack US interests 
in the region”.12  (Of course, the Nixon administration believed the threat posed by Arab regimes to be 
of minimal significance, but there was no need to subject American interests to trials unnecessarily).  
Diplomatic gestures and optimistic comments were therefore essential to creating a façade of support 
for the peace process which distracted the international community from the administration’s 
controversial true intentions. 
 
 
Ignoring Arab Overtures 
Nixon’s resolution to stall progress on the Arab-Israeli problem continued right through until 
October 1973, despite a string of peaceful overtures by Arab leaders during the early months of that 
year.  The first of these overtures was launched in January, when King Hussein visited the White 
House to share his plans for a settlement between Jordan and Israel.  Hussein had a long history of 
developing peace plans and, aware of the mounting frustration of his Arab cousins, was eager to 
secure an agreement with the Israelis before renewed hostilities began.  After meeting the 
administration, he told the press confidently: 
I am hopeful that within the near future the US will show a greater interest than it has [previously]… to 
make a contribution toward achieving a lasting peace in this area.  I am really quite optimistic about the 
trend.  I feel we may be on the threshold of important developments.13
However, during the Israeli Prime Minister’s visit the following month, America made no effort to 
modify Israel’s behaviour or attitude towards a negotiated settlement.  Indeed, “on March 12, [Golda] 
Meir arrived home and said ‘there is no basis’ for changing Israel’s policy on a Middle East 
settlement”.14  In spite of remarkable Arab concessions, including Sadat’s receptivity to a proposal 
                                                 
11 Barry Rubin (1973), ‘US Policy and the October War’, 7. 
12 William B. Quandt (1971), ‘The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71’, 41. 
13 King Hussein, US News and World Report (1973), January 15, cited in John Galvani (1973), ‘Look Who’s Coming to Dinner: 
Meir and Hussein Seek Peace in the US’, MERIP Reports, No. 14 (February), 9. 
14 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 104. 
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involving “Israeli-Egyptian sharing of petroleum resources [in Sinai] and [an] Israeli presence at Sharm 
el Sheik”, both Tel Aviv and the White House remained staunchly convinced that any attempt to 
negotiate with the Arabs was as undesirable as it was impossible at this time.15  Consequently, Meir 
spent her time in Washington discussing armament deals rather than peace projects.16
 
Even while Hussein’s overture was still playing, the Egyptians launched a second round.  On 
February 17, 1973, after Hussein’s Washington trip but before Meir’s, Sadat announced that he was 
sending his national security affairs advisor, Hafez Ismail, to America, “to press on President Nixon the 
need for diplomatic action in the Middle East”.17  Thus began what Barry Rubin describes as 
successive “‘cycles’ of negotiations”. 18  These cycles were characterised by an initial Arab overture, a 
second movement in which American officials endorse and compliment the overture, and then a grand 
finale in which the US government reveals its fundamental disinterest in any form of settlement.19  One 
typical example of these cycles involved Sadat offering to accept international control of the strategic 
city of Sharm el-Sheik, while the Saudi oil minister warned the Washington Post that Riyadh “would 
not expand oil production unless the US altered its pro-Israel stand”.20  The following day, on April 19, 
the ever-optimistic Secretary Rogers responded to this intricate ‘carrot and stick’ overture by stating 
that “the US would try to persuade the Arabs and Israel to begin ‘a genuine negotiating process’”.21  
However, as Rubin seems both delighted and disgusted to reveal, within a few mere months of this 
‘concerted effort’ to bring peace the Middle East, it emerged that America has signed a four-year deal 
to supply forty-eight F-4 Phantoms and thirty-six Skyhawks to Israel. 22  Rather than encouraging Tel 
Aviv to rein in its military and consider settlement terms, Israel was being rewarded with weapons 
systems far beyond the sophistication of the Arab militaries; supplies which would facilitate continued 
aggression towards neighbouring states. 
 
Now, despite the Nixon administration’s deliberate decision to stall the peace process, the 
relationship between Arab overtures and US-Israeli arms deals should not be overestimated.  In fact, 
given the administration’s incoherent conception of Middle East strategy, it is reasonable to suggest 
that Washington’s decision to supply Tel Aviv with new armaments bore no more than a coincidental 
correlation to Washington’s policy on the peace process.  This is not to say that contemporary 
witnesses did not arrive at the same conclusions that Rubin has – that US-Israeli arms deals were a 
                                                 
15 John Galvani (1973), ‘Look Who’s Coming to Dinner’, 8-9. 
16 Since Israel’s military aid package would expire at the end of the year, the Meir needed to ensure that a new arrangement 
would take its place without “any disruption in the arms flow”.  John Galvani (1973), ‘Look Who’s Coming to Dinner’, 10. 
17 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 103-4. 
18 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 104. 
19 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 104. 
20 Ahmad Yamani, Washington Post, April 18, 1973, cited in Barry Rubin (1973), ‘US Policy and the October War’, 7. 
21 Barry Rubin (1973), ‘US Policy and the October War’, 7. 
22 Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1973, cited in Barry Rubin (1973), ‘US Policy and the October War’, 7. 
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consciously slight against Arab overtures – but, probably the Americans were ignorant to the 
perceived significance of their actions. 
 
 
* * * * * * * 
 
For three years following the crisis in Jordan, the Nixon administration pursued a policy that 
actively sought to deter progress towards a Middle East peace settlement.  As Rubin summarises, 
such a development, while morally attractive, would demand “putting more pressure on Israel than US 
policy-makers were willing to venture”.23  To avoid public censure, the administration masked its 
controversial policy with a carefully crafted illusion of ongoing support for the settlement project.  Arab 
leaders, deceived by this illusion, launched several ambitious efforts to advance the peace process.  
However, since “all Arab concessions, especially Egyptian ones, were seen as signs of weakness 
which only confirmed the views already held by US leaders”, the White House saw no reason to 
review its opposition to a settlement.24  Consequently: 
Instead of chivvying the Israelis towards compromise and settlement, Washington… gave Israel every 
piece of military hardware on the Israeli shopping list and left it free to consolidate its positions in the 
occupied territories at will.25
The blunt truth of this policy was revealed in an unusually frank statement by Kissinger at a luncheon 
with key Arab representatives in September, 1973:  “’What is necessary,’ Kissinger said, ‘is to find 
ways to turn what is presently unacceptable to you into a situation with which you can live.’  This – 
maintenance of the status quo – was the real US position”.26
 
 
THE RETURN TO WAR 
Blinded by Assumptions 
Not surprisingly, the Arabs themselves were less than willing to endure the humiliating status 
quo indefinitely.  As early as October 1972, infuriated by the failure to make peaceful progress towards 
a territorial settlement, Sadat began publicly announcing his intention to revive the war with Israel.27  
Having inherited a country economically ruined and militarily humiliated, Egypt’s third president 
needed to take radical steps in order to prevent Cairo from losing its position in the Arab world.  A 
military victory would not only serve to restore Egypt’s status as the leading Arab nation, it would also 
afford Sadat the political capital to implement unpopular but essential modifications to the Egyptian 
economy.  In preparation for the attack, Sadat replaced Egypt’s raft of political generals with 
                                                 
23 Barry Rubin (1973), ‘US Policy and the October War’, 3. 
24 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 101. 
25 John Galvani (1973), ‘Look Who’s Coming to Dinner’, 10. 
26 Washington Post, September 26, 1973, cited in Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 107. 
27 Abraham Rabinovich (2004), The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East (Schocken), 25. 
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competent officers and ordered a thorough revision of Egyptian military tactics.  Meanwhile, Soviet 
armaments continued to arrive in great numbers.  Especially significant were the shipments of AT-3 
Saggar anti-tank guided missiles, which would soon be used to devastating effect against Israeli 
armour in the Sinai.28  Having acquired the necessary armaments to launch his attack, Sadat 
surprised the international community by expelling nearly all 20,000 of his Soviet military advisors.  
The White House interpreted this development as another sign that its strategic arrangement with 
Israel was successful in bringing pro-American stability to the Middle East.  In reality, the expulsion of 
Sadat’s Soviet advisors was a pre-emptive effort to limit Moscow’s ability to curb Cairo’s plans for war.   
 
As the months passed, Sadat continued to warn of his impending attack against Israel unless 
progress could be made in the settlement project.  However, since neither the US nor Israel 
considered Egypt a genuine threat, these warnings fell on deaf ears.  The failure to identify the very 
real threat in Sadat’s warlike words was the consequence of what subsequent investigations termed 
‘the conception’.  This conception was comprised of two assumptions: 
(a) Egypt would not go to war until it was able to stage deep strikes into Israel, particularly against its 
major military airfields, in order to neutralize Israel’s air force; 
(b) Syria would not launch a full-scale war against Israel unless Egypt was in the struggle too.29
Since the Egyptians were apparently yet to take delivery of fighter-bombers capable of neutralising 
Israeli air power, it was assumed that an Egyptian attack was not imminent.  In fact, Sadat worked 
hard to maintain this misconception, leaking false intelligence to Israel concerning missing parts for 
weapons systems and ill-trained personnel.  In May and August, Sadat staged large-scale military 
exercises near the Israeli border.  Just to be sure, the IDF was mobilised but the long-threatened 
Egyptian invasion never materialised.  These false starts cost Israel ten million dollars.30  
Consequently, when Egyptian troops began massing near the canal in early October, Israeli 
intelligence assumed further exercises.  Since Israel did not believe that Egypt was poised to attack, 
the curious buildup of Syrian forces near the Golan was also ignored.  Even the eleventh hour 
warnings of King Hussein, delivered in secret to Golda Meir, could not convince Israel that an attack 
was imminent.  As Mossad chief Zvi Zamir later mused, “We simply didn’t feel them capable [of 
war]”.31
 
 
The October War 
Despite all expectation, in the early afternoon of Saturday 6 October, 1973 – the Jewish Day 
of Atonement – Egyptian and Syrian forces swept into the Israeli occupied Sinai and Golan Heights.  
In the south, Egyptian troops used water canons to breach the carefully constructed Israeli defences, 
                                                 
28 Anon (n.d.), ‘Yom Kippur War: Combat Operations’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War (accessed 31/07/06). 
29 Avi Shlaim (2000), The Iron Wall (Penguin: London), 319. 
30 Anon (n.d.), ‘Yom Kippur: Lead Up to the Surprise Attack’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War (accessed 24/08/06). 
31 Abraham Rabinovich (2004), The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East, 50, 57. 
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advancing two army corps nearly fifteen kilometres inland.  The few Israeli units not on leave for Yom 
Kippur were swiftly overwhelmed.  To the north, Syrian forces outnumbered Israelis nine to one: 
In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses of two brigades and eleven artillery 
batteries with five divisions and 188 batteries.  At the onset of the battle, 188 Israeli tanks faced off 
against approximately 2,000 Syrian tanks.32
In both arenas, Soviet anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems were deployed widely to neutralise the 
sophisticated Israeli air force and veteran armoured divisions.  Caught off guard and facing such 
overwhelming numbers, Israel’s situation seemed suddenly desperate.   
 
By and large, the Americans had been equally blind to the impending attack.  When the 
startling news of the invasion reached the White House, Nixon immediately ordered “the forty-eight 
ships and thirty thousand men of the Sixth fleet” to the Eastern Mediterranean as a show of 
solidarity.33  With Arab forces overrunning Israeli positions, America pushed for an early ceasefire 
along the 1967 frontiers, “a move that would have cancelled out the Egyptian advances on the east 
bank of the Suez Canal”.34  Not surprisingly, neither the Egyptians nor their Soviet backers were 
enthusiastic about America’s proposal.  Indeed, the oil-producing Arab nations were so incensed by 
Washington’s proposal that they announced an escalating embargo on oil to Israel’s Western allies 
until such a time as the IDF withdrew from the Occupied Territories.  Faced with the possibility of an 
Israeli defeat, the US implemented a massive operation to re-supply the battered IDF.35  At Nixon’s 
request, Congress authorised $2.2 billion in emergency financial aid and increased Israel’s already 
substantial military aid by a further eight hundred percent.36  Meanwhile, America’s watchful presence 
in the Eastern Mediterranean was bolstered by the arrival of “two attack carriers and two amphibious 
assault carriers, the latter each carrying about two thousand Marines trained in desert warfare”.37  
Encouraged by America’s backing and armed with these new supplies, “Israel began to turn the tables 
on its enemies”.38   
 
                                                 
32 Anon (n.d.), ‘Yom Kippur War: Combat Operations’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War (accessed 31/07/06). 
33 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 109. 
34 Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 109. 
35 Interestingly, the president had ordered the re-supplying of Israel as early as the 6 October, and again on the 9, but on both 
occasions those orders were overruled by Kissinger, who presumably sought to engineer a situation that would be more 
conducive to establishing a regional peace.  This curious incident raises challenging questions as to which man – Nixon or 
Kissinger – was actually in charge of America’s foreign policy in 1973.  Patrick J Haney (1994), ‘The Nixon Administration and 
Middle East Crises: Theory and Evidence of Presidential Management of Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Political Research 
Quarterly, Vol. 47 (December), 948. 
36 Martha Wenger (1990), ‘US Aid to Israel: From Handshake to Embrace’, Middle East Report, No. 164/165 (May-August), 14. 
37 It is doubtful that Nixon intended to have American troops intervene directly in the conflict.  Instead, the presence of these 
forces was probably intended to pressure the Arabs into an early peace and discourage the Soviet Union from staging an 
intervention.  Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 109. 
38 Avi Shlaim (2000), The Iron Wall (Penguin: London), 320. 
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Four days after the war began, Syrian forces had been pushed back across the pre-war 
boundary; five days later, Operation Stouthearted Men broke through the enemy lines in Sinai and 
neutralised Egypt’s anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences.  As Israel advanced inexorably into Arab 
territory, threatening Damascus and Cairo, the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, revived calls for 
a ceasefire, hoping to preserve some advantage for Egypt.  On 22 October, UN Resolution 338 
granted Kosygin his ceasefire, but Israel intended to finish what it had started.  That night, under cover 
of darkness, the IDF continued its offensive west of the Suez Canal.  When morning broke, Israel had 
encircled Sadat’s Third Army, trapping them in the Sinai.  Israeli forces were just sixty miles from 
Cairo.  Tel Aviv justified the operation by alleging that Egypt had violated the ceasefire, destroying 
several Israeli tanks.  Washington was quietly satisfied with this excuse, but Moscow was outraged.  If 
the United States was not prepared to force Israel into compliance with the ceasefire, Brezhnev 
warned Kissinger, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to take matters into its own hands.39  
Although the Kremlin was unlikely to actually commit troops to the Middle East, Washington took this 
threat very seriously.  For the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis, American forces went to 
DEFCON 3, placing “some two million soldiers around the globe, including the 82nd Airborne Division 
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Strategic Air Command and some National Guard and Reserve 
units” on alert.40  Whether Washington’s dramatic response was guided by deliberate brinksmanship 
or genuine fear is uncertain.  Either way, it alarmed the Soviets sufficiently for Moscow to de-escalate 
the crisis; neither Egypt nor Syria was worth the cost of a direct confrontation with America.  On 26 
October, twenty days after the beginning of hostilities, organised fighting ended on all fronts, paving 
the way for negotiations to begin. 
                                                 
39 Abraham Rabinovich (2004), The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East, 479. 
40 Remarkably, it seems that President Nixon was asleep when the move to DEFCON 3 was ordered by Kissinger and the 
Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), again raising the question of who really decided America’s foreign policy.  
However, as Stephen Ambrose notes, “Nixon probably would have agreed with the nuclear alert, had he been awake”, leading 
Haney to conclude that this episode simply illustrates the organisational sophistication of the Nixon-Kissinger White House: 
“One might expect [such a highly centralised system] to collapse under the circumstances of presidential inattention.  To the 
contrary, the Nixon advisory system worked even in the president’s absence”.  Stephen E. Ambrose (1991), Nixon: Ruin and 
Recovery (Simon and Shuster: New York), 234-35; Patrick J Haney (1994), ‘The Nixon Administration and Middle East Crises: 
Theory and Evidence of Presidential Management of Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47 
(December), 949; Barry Rubin (1974), ‘US Policy, January-October 1973’, 112. 
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CONCLUSION 
A STRATEGIC MISCALCULATION 
 
 
In order to achieve the objective of lasting stability within the Middle East, the United States 
needed to identify a comprehensive and coherent strategy for the geo-pivotal region.  Following a 
decade of strategic uncertainty and vulnerability, the Nixon administration resolved to meet America’s 
strategic needs through formal partnership with the state of Israel, as well as similar agreements with 
the governments of Turkey and Iran.  However, with its emphasis on using force of arms to encircle 
and suppress Arab grievances, rather than fostering positive engagement with regional tensions, this 
arrangement represented an incomplete – and therefore inadequate – response to the problem of 
Middle East stability.  Indeed, Nixon’s controversially partisan approach not only failed to tackle the 
myriad issues which plagued the fragile region, it actually promised to exacerbate them. 
 
 
A LEGACY OF INCOHERENCE 
Lack of coherence was by no means a novel feature of American Middle East strategy.  
Incoherence was common to several previous incarnations of American strategy in the region: 
Truman’s creation of the Northern Tier shield may have resolved the immediate problem of Britain’s 
inability to support Greece and Turkey against Soviet pressure, but it failed to pre-empt Britain’s 
inevitable abdication in the heart of the Middle East, therefore allowing the Western system in the core 
states to deteriorate dangerously.  The decade of piecemeal bilateralism which followed the twin 
shocks of the Suez War and the Iraqi Revolution was equally incoherent, as the US, lacking clear 
strategic options and distracted by other foreign policy priorities, allowed the Western system to 
deteriorate still further (to the marked advantage of enemy influences).  In fact, between 1945 and 
1970, the Eisenhower administration, with its emphasis upon pro-active engagement with the Arab 
bloc and firm opposition to Israeli expansionism, was the only administration which sought to extend a 
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coherent, region-wide strategy for the Middle East.   Ultimately, the challenge of incorporating both the 
Egyptians and their Iraqi rivals into an American system impeded Eisenhower’s grand ambitions, but 
amidst the strategic incoherence of other Cold War administrations, Eisenhower’s uniquely coherent 
conception of Middle East strategy demands recognition. 
 
In light of the legacy of American strategic incoherence, Nixon’s reaction to the events of 
September 1970 was by no means unprecedented.  However, this fact did not make Nixon’s failure to 
delineate a suitable regional strategy any less problematic.  Indeed, the controversially polarised 
approach that emerged following the Jordan crisis was actually more problematic than previous 
expressions of strategic incoherence had been.  Previous expressions of incoherence had failed to 
look beyond the immediate needs of the region, thereby allowing pockets of instability to persist 
unopposed.  However, despite this failing, previous expressions had been essentially even-handed in 
their approach to both the Arabs and the Israelis.  Nixon’s unbridled support for Tel Aviv from 1970 
marked a clear break from this tradition of even-handedness.  As a consequence of this development, 
US strategy in the Middle East went from being merely incoherent, to being actively antagonistic. 
 
Pointedly, Nixon himself was unconcerned by the incoherence of his controversial, Israeli-
centric approach.  As the strategic geography of the sentinel network readily demonstrates, Nixon – a 
convert to the philosophy of realpolitik – was far more interested in power than popularity when it 
came to securing the American system abroad.  The administration’s choice of allies in this venture 
was undeniably controversial: Spain and Portugal were each subject to fascist dictatorships, both 
Greece and Iran were governed by military juntas, and the legacy of human rights abuses committed 
by the Turkish continues to undermine Istanbul’s bid for European integration today.  However, 
undesirable, undemocratic and unpopular as these regimes were, they each possessed the strength 
and willingness to fulfil the administration’s hegemonic ambitions, and were therefore considered 
valuable allies by the administration.  In the same way, while it was obvious that Washington’s overt 
support for Tel Aviv would provoke an intensification of anti-American sentiment within the Arab 
states, White House officials believed that the benefits of the US-Israeli strategic partnership ultimately 
outweighed these fleeting disadvantages.  In any case, thought Washington, the disgruntled Arabs 
would necessarily be driven to acquiescence eventually by the need to maintain friendly relations with 
the West and fear of the ‘invincible’ IDF.   
 
 
A FATAL MISINTERPRETATION 
Unfortunately, Nixon’s confidence in Israel’s ability to subdue the inevitable Arab unrest was 
seriously misplaced and therefore the administration’s decision to advance a US-Israeli partnership at 
the expense of US-Arab relations represented a major strategic miscalculation for the US.  The root of 
this miscalculation lay in the administration’s unique interpretation of the events of September 1970.  
According to the White House, the Jordan crisis had been pacified by a mixture of American 
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diplomatic resolve and Israeli military power.  In reality however, the US-Israeli contribution was far 
less significant.  Throughout the crisis, the White House had been paralysed by indecision.  Even at 
the height of the insurrection, with foreign armoured divisions threatening to convey the rebels all the 
way to Amman, Washington procrastinated and failed to offer anything more concrete than rhetoric to 
support to imperilled Jordanian regime.  Tel Aviv was more pro-active than Washington and the Israeli 
Air Force did indeed stage flyovers of enemy positions.  However, the impact of these aerial displays 
on the Syro-Palestinian campaign is debatable.  As the crisis wore on, with no sign of direct American 
assistance in sight, it fell to Hussein’s own air and ground forces to dispatch the revolutionaries, a feat 
which they accomplished with the unwitting assistance of factional rivalries within the Syrian military 
command.1   
 
The US-Israeli contribution was therefore largely inconsequential to the cessation of hostilities; 
ultimately, it was the Jordanian military, not American rhetoric or Israeli posturing, which had repulsed 
the Syrians and pacified the Palestinians.  In light of this revelation, two major flaws in Nixon’s Israeli-
centric approach become apparent.  The first of these was the extent to which the administration 
misjudged the importance of maintaining good working relations with the Arab bloc, the second was 
the overestimation of Israel’s capacity to stabilise Arab unrest. 
 
 
Underestimating the Arabs 
For as long as the United States had been involved in the Middle East, accepted wisdom had 
taught that it was the Arab regimes who dictated regional stability.  Consequently, despite the growing 
disinterest in a US-Arab arrangement, American policy-makers had remained cautious of advancing 
strategies that would offend Arab sensibilities.  However, the defeat of the Syro-Palestinian uprising 
threw this strategic conception into doubt.  As the White House saw it, the fearsome fedayeen had 
been cowed by mere threats of interventionary force, the Syrians had retreated at the arrival of the 
American navy and Israeli jets, and other influential Arab players – particularly the Iraqis – had 
remained conspicuously neutral.  In light of these events, the White House concluded that the Arab 
threat had been entirely misjudged by previous administrations and therefore efforts to appease Arab 
sentiments in American policy-making were unnecessary.   
 
Belief in the impotence and disunity of Arab power was the foundation of Nixon’s 
unambiguous partnership with Israel and wilful antagonisation of US-Arab relations.  It was 
                                                 
1 The Syrian ground forces that entered Jordan were commanded by de facto Baath Party leader, Salah Jadid; the commander 
of the air force was his rival, Hafez al-Assad.  Assad, a military pragmatist, disapproved of Jadid’s ultra-leftwing government and 
irresponsible foreign policies.  During the Jordan crisis, Assad deliberately withheld air cover for Jadid’s ground forces, leaving 
them vulnerable to Jordanian airstrikes.  Jadid returned to Damascus disgraced by his defeat.  Within three months, the 
bloodless Corrective Revolution had ousted Jadid and installed Assad in his stead.  
Anon (n.d.), ‘Hafez al-Assad’, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hafez_al-Assad (accessed 24.05.06). 
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responsible for discrediting the Arabist voice in Washington, thereby allowing the pro-Israel lobby 
greater influence over policy-making, encouraging the US to rely exclusively upon non-Arab sentinel 
states for stability, and leading the administration to the controversial decision to stall the Arab-Israeli 
peace process.  However, since this belief sprung from a fundamentally flawed interpretation of the 
crisis, it was entirely misplaced.  Arab forces had created the instability of September 1970 and Arab 
forces had also been responsible for the end of that instability.  Clearly, the concept that the US could 
afford to ignore Arab grievances indefinitely was a serious mistake.   
 
 
Overestimating the Israelis 
Contrary to Washington’s official interpretation, Israel had not pacified an inter-Arab conflict by 
the mere threat of intervention.  Consequently, there was no evidence that Tel Aviv could successfully 
deploy the IDF in a stabilising capacity and the emergence of an American strategic alliance with 
Israel following the crisis was therefore founded upon a misconception.  Indeed, the great irony of 
America’s decision to seek regional stability through partnership with Israel was that, by and large, the 
primary source of conflict in the Middle East was Tel Aviv’s own belligerent foreign policy. 
 
As if pathologically committed to antagonising its neighbours, the IDF was constantly 
provoking skirmishes with Arab forces along Israel’s periphery.  Washington generally chose to remain 
neutral in such matters, stating bluntly that, while the US “would prefer to see no military action at all… 
[the White House had] no intention of telling Israel how to defend itself”.2  However, this diplomatic 
neutrality was deeply undermined by the fact that, in rewarding Israel with a strategic partnership, 
Nixon had effectively endorsed Israel’s antagonistic activities.  This is not to say that Washington 
never sought to restrain Israeli military aggression: during the summer of 1970 (before the formal 
partnership), the US supplied Israel with “approximately $7 million worth” of military aid, ostensibly to 
consolidate Israeli defences and therefore discourage a violation of the ceasefire with Egypt.  
However, as critical State Department officials observed, rather than fostering peace between Tel Aviv 
and Cairo, this arrangement actually “increase[d] Israeli capabilities to perform the kinds of actions 
which, in fact, [Washington sought] to deter”.3  In the same way, rather than facilitating the 
establishment of a stable American system in the Middle East, the advent of the US-Israeli alliance 
simply buoyed the IDF towards further acts of belligerence.   
 
Granted, Israel’s aggressive approach was not entirely without merit.  As Harold Saunders 
commented in 1972: 
                                                 
2 Harold Saunders (1972), ‘Memorandum for Dr Kissinger: Israeli-Syrian Military Clashes, November 21’, DDRS (Gale Group: 
Farmington Mills, Michigan), Document Number CK3100546228. 
3 Anon: State Department (1970), ‘Deterring Possible Major Unilateral Violation of the Middle East Ceasefire by Israel, 
September 6’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills), Document Number CK3100548307, subsection B, paragraph 1, 3. 
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It is hard to argue that the Israeli strategy is ineffective since it has already resulted in the securing of 
Israel’s border with Jordan and, at least for the moment, in substantial Lebanese control and fedayeen 
caution in southern Lebanon.4
In the long-run however, Nixon’s tacit support for Israel’s heavy-handed policies undermined regional 
stability and served to tarnish the international image of the United States.  It is no coincidence 
therefore that Arab terrorist activity intensified following the formalisation of the US-Israeli 
arrangement; aggravated by the Israelis and frustrated by America’s support for Israel at the expense 
of Arab interests, the Arab population had little choice but to resort to violence to make its grievances 
heard. 
 
 
REVELATIONS OF THE OCTOBER WAR 
In October 1973, the strategic miscalculations which had characterised Nixon’s controversially 
polarised approach to the Middle East were exposed by the sudden resurgence of open warfare 
between Israel, Egypt and Syria.  The successful Syro-Egyptian attack not only turned the 
administration’s misplaced belief in Arab impotence on its head, it also undermined Washington’s faith 
in Israel’s regional dominance.  Indeed, the war revealed that Israel, whose military prowess had been 
a deciding factor in its promotion to regional guardianship, “could not fight a prolonged engagement in 
which its army did not determine the timing and pace of fighting without depending on a re-supply from 
the United States”.5
 
At the end of the war, Washington’s ill-founded regional paradigm was further undermined, 
when – contrary to expert predictions – Arab oil-producers cut off America’s oil supply.  Thanks to the 
Nixon administration’s controversial disregard for Arab grievances and damaging association with IDF 
aggression, during November 1973 the US faced an oil deficit of “at least 225,000 barrels per day”.  
Given the impact of this deficit on America’s military activity (especially in Southeast Asia), the 
strategic miscalculation inherent in allowing US-Arab relations to deteriorate so dramatically was 
manifestly evident.  As John R. Nolan, Acting Assistant for Petroleum Affairs at the Department of 
Defence informed Arthur Mendolia, Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics: 
There can be no avoidance of the unpleasant fact that the ability of the United States to conduct its 
military operations with complete flexibility, unhindered by petroleum logistics considerations, is now for 
the first time temporarily inhibited.6
                                                 
4 Harold Saunders (1972), ‘Memorandum for Dr Kissinger: Israeli-Syrian Military Clashes, November 21’. 
5 In fact, a number of America’s strategic allies protested Nixon’s polarised approach to the Middle East by denying the use of 
their bases as launch-pads to re-supply the IDF during the war.  The only European base which cooperated with America’s 
emergency airlift to Israel was Lajes Air Base in the Azores, situated over five and a half thousand kilometres from Tel Aviv.  
Esther Howard (1983), ‘Israel: The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’, MERIP Reports, No, 112 (February), 17; Joe Stork (1980), ‘The 
Carter Doctrine and US Bases in the Middle East’, MERIP Reports, No. 90 (September), 6. 
6 John R. Nolan, Acting Assistant for Petroleum Affairs, DOD (1973), ‘Memorandum for Mr Mendolia: Military Petroleum 
Situation, November 5’, DDRS (Gale Group: Farmington Mills, Michigan), Document Number: CK3100413397. 
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Having become painfully aware of the full cost of pursuing an exclusively pro-Israeli approach, 
the White House once again set about reviewing its regional strategy.  In an effort to re-establish 
working relations with the Arab bloc, Washington’s post-1973 approach restored a greater degree of 
even-handedness to America’s dealings in the Middle East.  At the fore of this effort to rekindle US-
Arab relations was the highly-publicised campaign of ‘Shuttle Diplomacy’, designed to pressure Israel 
into accepting progress on a settlement regarding the Occupied Territories. 
 
Meanwhile, having learnt not to take the flow of Gulf oil for granted, the United States 
diversified its foreign energy suppliers to include Venezuela, Nigeria and Mexico and established the 
Strategic Oil Reserve in preparation for future oil shocks.  Around the same time, Washington initiated 
a long-term strategy which saw the US “steadily accumulating military muscle in the Gulf” in order to 
secure direct control of the geo-pivotal oil-fields.  This strategy was outlined in a 1975 article entitled 
‘Seizing Arab Oil’, in which the author discussed “how we could solve all our economic and political 
problems by taking over the Arab oil fields [and] bringing in Texans and Oklahomans to operate them”.  
Arguably, the current war in Iraq represents the culmination of this thirty-year process.7
 
 
ONGOING INCOHERENCE 
Despite the superficial revival of US-Arab relations, America’s strategic approach following the 
October War was no more coherent than the approach it was drafted to replace.  For a start, 
Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy only ever dealt with Israeli-Egyptian territorial grievances; masked by 
highly publicised progress over the Sinai Peninsula, Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Jordanian, Israeli-
Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese issues were all left glaringly unresolved.  Moreover, the US continued to 
rely primarily upon non-Arab powers to ensure American hegemony in the Middle East, rather than 
cultivating a coherent, Arab-inclusive approach to the region.  Consequently, Iran rather than Iraq 
remained the key to America’s security strategy in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, a fact evidenced by 
America’s strategic shock and scramble for foreign military bases following Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 
1979.  Likewise, there was no sign of deceleration in Washington’s partnership with Israel.  In fact, 
“Israel’s aid skyrocketed from $30 million in 1970 to $2.2 billion in 1974”.8  Even the momentous Sinai 
II peace deal was engineered to Israel’s advantage.  As Avi Shlaim has observed, the agreement was 
effectively “a vast real estate deal in which the United States bought a slice of the Sinai Desert from 
Israel in exchange for a huge financial and political consideration” – a consideration, it should be 
                                                 
7 Robert Dreyfuss (2003), ‘The Thirty-Year Itch’, Mother Jones, March-April, 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2003/03/ma_273_01.html (accessed 15.11.05). 
8 Kathleen Christison (1999), Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on US Middle East Policy (University of California Press: 
Berkeley), 124. 
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noted, that included a “secret commitment to ‘maintain Israel’s defense’ with the most sophisticated 
weaponry” available.9
 
Recent administrations – particularly Bush I and II – have sought to revitalise American efforts 
in the Middle East and reposition the Arab bloc within a new US strategy for the region.  To a certain 
extent, this repositioning marks a return to the strategic wisdom of the Eisenhower administration.  
However, Eisenhower not only understood the vital importance of engaging the Arabs in US Middle 
East strategy, he also had a plan for achieving this ambition.10  On the other hand, despite the current 
administration’s rhetoric of building a ‘coalition’ between the United States and Arab powers, a clearly-
defined blueprint for working with the Arab bloc remains unforthcoming.  Consequently, efforts to 
reposition the Arabs in US strategy have suffered from the same crippling incoherence as previous 
approaches.  Rather than seeking to foster stability through an “indigenous… defense arrangement”, 
to which the US would “render limited military assistance” when necessary, recent administrations 
have pursued much heavier-handed policies, engaging directly in the region to impose pro-Western 
systems by force and subjugating Arab states by means of economic imperialism and the proliferation 
of American military muscle.11  As a result, half a century after Eisenhower first undertook the quest 
for coherence in US Middle East strategy, the strategic ambitions of his administration remain glaringly 
incomplete.  With developments in the fragile region more volatile than ever, it is high time a new 
champion emerged to finish the work that Eisenhower began and bring an end to decades of strategic 
incoherence. 
 
                                                 
9 Avi Shlaim (1988), ‘The Impact of U.S. Policy in the Middle East’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter), 19; 
Frank Forrestal (1977), ‘The Sinai-American Connection’, MERIP Reports, No, 63 (December), 19. 
10 NSC (1954), ‘NSC 5428: United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, July 23’, DDRS (Gale Group: 
Farmington Hills), Document Number: CK3100102500. 
11 NSC (1954), ‘NSC 5428: United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, July 23’. 
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